Jurisdiction and international responsibility in peace support operations: The behrami and saramati cases

Human Rights Law Review

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 151-170

  Sari, Aurel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 40249098911     PISSN: 14617781     EISSN: 17441021     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/hrlr/ngm046     Document Type: Article

References (119)

1. (2007) 45 EHRR SE10.
2. 2001-XII 333
3. (2007) 44 EHRR SE5. See Williams and Shah, 'Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States', (2002) 7 European Human Rights Law Review 775
4. and Rüth and Trilsch, 'Bankovic v. Belgium (Admissibility). App. No. 52207/99', (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 168.
5. (2007) 44 EHRR 52.
6. See Shah, 'Seeking Remedies for Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Markovic v Italy', (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 412.
7. Regarding the extra-territorial applicability of the ECHR, see Happold, 'Bankovic v Belgium and the Territorial Scope of the European Convention on Human Rights, (2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review 77
8. Lawson, 'Life After Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights', in Coomans and Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004) at 83
9. O'Boyle, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Comment on "Life After Bankovic"', ibid. at 125
10. Wilde, 'The "Legal Space" or "Espace Juridique" of the European Convention on Human Rights: Is It Relevant to Extraterritorial State Action?', (2005) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 115.
11. See also Greenwood, 'Jurisdiction, NATO and the Kosovo Conflict, in Capps, Evans and Konstadinidis (eds), Asserting Jurisdiction: International and European Legal Perspectives (Oxford: Hart, 2003) 145.
12. S/RES/1244 (1999).
13. Letter dated 7 June 1999 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 7 June 1999, S/1999/649.
14. In addition, Saramati also claimed that he did not have access to court in violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the ECHR.
15. Article 1, ECHR provides: 'The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.'
16. In contrast to the applicants in Behrami, Saramati also accepted that the mere fact that Germany had acted as the lead nation for the Multinational Brigade Southeast did not create a sufficient jurisdictional link between him and Germany for the purposes of Article 1, ECHR.
17. Supra n. 1 at para. 68.
18. Specifically, the Court recalled Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain A 240 (1992)
19. (1992) 14 EHRR 745
20. Loizidou v Turkey 1996-VI 2216
21. (1996) 23 EHRR 513
22. Cyprus v Turkey (1997) 23 EHRR 244
23. Issa and Others v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 27
24. Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia 2004-VII 179
25. (2004) 40 EHRR 46
26. Öcalan v Turkey 2005 IV 131
27. (2005) 41 EHRR 45
28. and Hussein v Albania and Others (2006) 42 EHRR SE16.
29. Supra n. 1 at para. 71.
30. Ibid. at para. 72.
31. The applicants submitted that KFOR was not an independent subject of international law and thus could not incur international responsibility for the acts or omissions of its personnel in its own right.
32. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1 at para. 155.
33. See Banner and Thomson, 'Human Rights Review of State Acts Performed in Compliance with EC Law - Bosphorus Airways v Ireland', (2005) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 649
34. Hoffmeister, 'Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirket v. Ireland. App. No. 45036/98', (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 442
35. Costello, 'The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe, (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 87
36. and Parga, 'Bosphorus v Ireland and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe', (2006) 31 European Law Review 251.
37. The relatively large number of third party submissions clearly illustrates the importance accorded by the intervening States to the legal issues raised by the present case.
38. Similar submissions were made by Spain in proceedings concerning the Spanish Police Unit in Kosovo before the Human Rights Committee, see Azem Kurbogaj and Ghevdet Kurbogaj v Spain (1374/2005), Admissibility Decision, CCPR/C/87/D/1374/2005 (2006).
39. Supra n. 1 at para. 129.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. at para. 133.
42. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. United States of America), Jurisdiction, ICJ Reports 1984, 392 at para. 107
43. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 1992, 3 at para. 39
44. and Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 1992, 114 at para. 42.
45. Supra n. 1 at para. 149.
46. See text accompanying n. 11.
47. Ibid. at para. 112.
48. Ibid. at paras 103 and 107.
49. Ibid. at para. 121. The relevant rules were set out by the ECtHR in detail in the opening parts of its judgment.
50. As the Government of Denmark noted in its submissions, "The central question was...whether personnel contributed by [troop-contributing nations] were also exercising jurisdiction on behalf of the [troop-contributing nations], ibid. at para. 97.
51. If at all, the ECtHR should have dealt with the applicants' submissions from the perspective of the law of State responsibility.
52. See Fröhlich, 'Keeping Track of UN Peace-keeping - Suez, Srebrenica, Rwanda and the Brahimi Report', (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 185.
53. Article V(7), Model agreement between the United Nations and Member States contributing personnel and equipment to United Nations peace-keeping operations: Report of the Secretary-General, 23 May 1991, A/46/185.
54. See Bothe, Streitkräfte internationaler Organisationen: Zugleich ein Beitrag zu vökerrechtlichen Grundfragen der Anwesenheit fremder Truppen (Köln: Carl Heymanns, 1968) at 37-59
55. Condorelli, 'Le Statut des forces de I'ONU et le droit international humanitaire', (1995) 78 Rivista di diritto internazionale 881 at 885-8.
56. Generally, see Siekmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peace-keeping Forces (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991). Cf. Attorney-General v Nissan [1970] AC 179 at 222.
57. Articles VI(44) and VI(47)(b), Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations: Report of the Secretary-General, 9 October 1990, A/45/594.
58. Cf Dorigo,'Imputazione e responsabilia internazionale per l'attivita delle forze di peacekeeping delle Nazioni Unite', (2002) 85 Rivista di diritto internazionale 903, especially at 927-32.
59. Supra n. 1 at para. 70.
60. Issa v Turkey, supra n. 10 at para. 71.
61. Cf Findlay v. United Kingdom 1997-I 263; (1997) 24 EHRR 221.
62. Generally, see Bucherer, Die Vereinbarkeit von Militärgerichten mit dem Recht auf ein faires Verfahren gemäß Art. 6 Abs. 1 EMRK, Art. 8 Abs. 1 AMRK und Art. 14 Abs. 1 des UN-Paktes über bürgerliche und politische Rechte (Berlin: Springer, 2005).
63. Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005).
64. N. K. v. Austria (1979) 77 International Law Reports 470 (Austria, Superior Provincial Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Vienna).
65. On the delegation of Chapter VII powers, see Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
66. See Guillaume,'Le cadre juridique de l'action de la KFOR au Kosovo', in Tomuschat (ed.) Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2002) 243 at 244-8.
67. Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ('KFOR') and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999, (1999) 38 International Legal Materials 1217.
68. Supra n. 1 at para. 124.
69. Ibid. at para. 11.
70. Concerning the legal basis of UN peace support operations, see Bothe, 'Peace-keeping', in Simma, Paulus and Chaitidou (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 648 at 684-6
71. and Orakhelashvili, 'The Legal Basis of United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations', (2002-2003) 43 Virginia Journal of International Law 485.
72. See Chapman, 'The United Nations Emergency Force: Legal Status', (1958) 57 Michigan Law Review 56
73. Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963)
74. and Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, Vol. 1 PT2. The Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) at 221-529.
75. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter). Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962, 151 at 177.
76. Examples include the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) established by Security Council Resolution 745 of 28 February 1992, S/RES/745(1992), and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) established by Security Council Resolution 858 of 24 August 1993, S/RES/858 (1993).
77. See Financing of the United Nations Protection Force, the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force and the United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters: Report of the Secretary-General, 20 September 1996, A/51/ 389. On the claims practice of the UN, see Schmalenbach, Die Haftung internationaler Organisationen im Rahmen von Militäreinsätzen und Territorialverwaltungen (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004) at 166-512.
78. Article 4 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations, 2004 Report of the ILC, 56th Session, 3 May-4 June and 5 July-6 August 2004, A/59/10 at 103-9.
79. Supra n. 1 at para. 141.
80. Ibid. at para. 135.
81. Article 5, Draft Articles, supra n. 48 at 109-15.
82. Cf. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, 14 at para. 115
83. and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Merits, ICJ Judgment of 26 February 2007, unreported, at paras 398-407.
84. See supra n. 29 and accompanying text.
85. Indeed, the applicants argued that the legal character of KFOR was 'sufficiently different to UNMIK as to engage the respondent States individually', supra n. 1 at para. 123.
86. See also the third party submissions of the UN on this point, ibid. at para. 114.
87. Supra n. 5 at operative para. 6 (emphasis added).
88. In any event, the word 'auspices' is not a technical legal term and therefore not decisive as regards the level of control exercised by the UN.
89. Report of the Secretary General, supra n. 47 at para. 17.
90. See also Third Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, 13 May 2005, A/CN4/553 at 16-8.
91. It is not necessary to decide this question for present purposes. However, see Lüder, 'Die völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit der Nordatlantikvertrags-Organisation bei der militärischen Absicherung der Friedensverembarung von Dayton', (2001) 43 Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht 107
92. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on Human Rights in Kosovo: Possible establishment of review mechanisms, 11 October 2004, CDL-AD(2004)033 at para. 79
93. Stein, 'The Attribution of Possible Internationally Wrongful Acts: Responsibility of NATO or of Its Member States?', in Tomuschat, supra n. 39 at 181
94. and Pellet, 'L'imputabilite d'eventuels actes illicites: Responsabilite de l'OTAN ou des Etats membres', in ibid. at 193.
95. See also Stahn, 'International Territorial Administration in the Former Yugoslavia: Origins, Development and Challenges Ahead', (2001) 61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 107, especially at 150-4
96. Cerone, 'Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo', (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 469
97. and Krieger, 'Die Verantwortlichkeit Deutschlands nach der EMRK für seine Streitkräfte im Auslandseinsatz', (2002) 62 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 669.
98. Ilaz Kasumaj v. Greece, Decision of 5 July 2007, Application No. 6974/05
99. Slavisa Gajic v. Germany, Decision of 28 August 2007, Application No. 31446/02
100. Dušan Berić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision of 16 October 2007, Application Nos 36357/04, 36360/04, 38346/04, 41705/04, 45190/04, 45578/04, 45579/04, 45580/04, 91/05, 97/05, 100/05, 101/05, 1121/05, 1123/05, 1125/05, 1129/05, 1132/05, 1133/05, 1169/05, 1172/05, 1175/05, 1177/05, 1180/05, 1185/05, 20793/05 and 25496/05.
101. Supra n. 1 at para. 116.
102. Ibid. at para. 149.
103. See Working paper on the Accountability of International Personnel Taking Part in Peace Support Operations submitted by Françoise Hampson, 7 July 2005, E/CN4/Sub.2/2005/42.
104. Concerning the judicial review of Security Council resolutions, see Akande, 'The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?', (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 309
105. Martenczuk, 'The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?', (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 517
106. and Petculescum, 'The Review of the United Nations Security Council Decisions by the International Court of Justice', (2005) 52 Netherlands International Law Review 167.
107. Sarooshi, supra n. 38 at 163-6.
108. See supra n. 56
109. and the accompanying text as well as the Genocide Case, supra n. 51 at paras 398-407.
110. See also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13; 11 IHRR 905 (2004) at para. 10, and more generally, Brownlie, 'The Responsibility of States for the Acts of International Organizations', in Ragazzi (ed), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) at 355.
111. 1 UNTS 15.
112. For an example of such an exercise of criminal jurisdiction, see Mohamet Bici, Skender Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786.
113. Article 10, Charter provides: 'In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.'
114. Supra n. 1 at para. 151.
115. See the cases referred to at supra n. 10.
116. As the ECtHR noted in Bosphorus, 'it has also been accepted that a Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations, supra n. 14 at para. 153. The 'international legal obligation' in question arises whenever an international superior issues a lawful command to members of a national contingent.
117. It is interesting to note that in the case of Drozd and Janousek the ECtHR declared in a similar fashion that the existence of a jurisdictional link between the applicants and the respondent States depended on whether or not the acts complained of could be attributed to the respondent States. However, in that case the ECtHR did not in fact apply the test of attributability, but instead found that no jurisdictional link existed because the officials in question did not act in their capacity as officials of the respondent States. See Drozd and Janousek, supra n. 10 at paras 91 and 96.
118. Supra n. 1 at para. 149.
119. For example, both the respondent States and the intervening States have argued forcefully that serious repercussions would ensue if the ECtHR were to find that the applicants fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent States, as this would deter participation in UN peacekeeping operations and would undermine the coherence and effectiveness of such operations.