Statistics and politics in a "knowledge society"

Social Indicators Research

Volumn 86, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 177-200

  Giovannini, Enrico ^a  

^a OECD   (France)

Author keywords

Democracy; Economic theory; Policy; Statistics

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ECONOMIC THEORY; INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY; INTERNET; KNOWLEDGE; MODELING; OECD; POLICY MAKING;

EID: 40049104112     PISSN: 03038300     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11205-007-9137-z     Document Type: Article

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