Locating third world resistance in the international law on foreign investment

International Community Law Review

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 427-444

  Odumosu, Ibironke T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Grassroots movements; ICSID; International law on foreign investment; Investment dispute settlement; NGOs; Norms; Resistance; Third world

Indexed keywords

EID: 40049087827     PISSN: 18719740     EISSN: 18719732     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/187197407X261421     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (60)

1. Some Third World scholars have commenced a lively debate on the impact of Third World resistance on international law and vice versa. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance (2003);
2. Upendra. Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (2nd ed., 2006);
3. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Poverty, Agency and Resistance in the Future of International Law: An African Perspective", 27 Third. World Quarterly (2006) p. 799.
4. M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2d ed. 2004).
5. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and William Park, "The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11", 28 Yale International Law Journal (2003) p. 365.
6. In the present era, non-disputing parties sometimes acquire participatory privileges in investment dispute settlement proceedings. Rule 37(2) [ICSID] Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, ICSID/15 April 2006, codifies the rule on admission of amicus curiae briefs. For a discussion of these new rules, see Ibironke T. Odumosu, "Revisiting NGO Participation in WTO and Investment Dispute Setdement: From Procedural Arguments to (Substantive) Public Interest Considerations", 44 Canadian Yearbook of International Law (2006) p. 353.
7. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (Mar. 18, 1965), 5 I.L.M (1965) p. 532 [ICSID Convention].
8. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Odier States, (Mar. 18,1965) 5 I.L.M. (1965) p. 524, art. 9. For reasons on Third World states' early ratification of the ICSID Convention
9. see Ibironke T. Odumosu, "The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World", 8 San Diego International Law Journal (2007) p. 345.
10. This approach mostly falls within a Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) perspective. For TWAIL's characteristic "sensibilities", see Makau wa Mutua, "What is TWAIL?", 94 ASIL Proceedings (2000) p. 31.
11. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker Sc Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms (2002);
12. Margaret E. Keck Sf. Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (1998) (discussing the work of "principledissue" or "transnational advocacy networks" in seeking to change behaviour in the international society).
13. See also Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (2005), especially Part 4 - "The Local in the Global" (discussing the inter-relationship between local and transnational activism groups).
14. See for example, Aguas del Tunari SA. v. The Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/02) 20 ICSID Rev.-FILJ (2005) p. 445 [Aguas del Tunari].
15. This is true also of big projects like big dam building in much of the Third World. For an analysis of India's Narmada Valley dams and the failure of grassroots resistance while transnational coalitions eventually encountered success, see Sanjeev Khagram, "Restructuring the Global Politics of Development: The Case of India's Narmada. Valley Dams", in Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, supra note 8, p. 206.
16. For an extensive discussion of these strategies, see Ibironke T. Odumosu, "The Law and Politics of Engaging Resistance in Investment Dispute Settlement", 26 Perm State International Law Review__ (2007) (Forthcoming).
17. For an analogous discussion on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and customary international law, see Bernard Kishoiyian, "The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formation of Customary International Law", 14 Journal of International Law and Business (1994) p. 327;
18. Andrew T. Guzman, "Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties", 38 Virginia Journal International Law (1998) p. 639;
19. Andreas Lowenfeld, "Investment Agreements and International Law", 42 Columbia journal of Transnational Law (2003) p. 123. Several authors opine that BITs constitute lex specialis between the parties but a few others suggest that even if BITs do not reflect customary international law, they point toward, the development of general principles on the international law of foreign investment. Yet, some like Professor Sornarajah argue that it is fallacious to claim that investment treaties constitute customary international law.
20. Sornarajah, supra note 2 at p. 436.
21. Martha Finnemore Sc Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", 52 International Organisation (1998) p. 887. For a definition of "epistemic community"
22. see Peter Haas,"Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", 46 International Organisation (1992) p. 1 at 3.
23. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, 3 August 2005, 44 I.L.M. (2005) p. 1345.
24. For example of an earlier WTO case on this subject, see United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998).
25. Three of the most prominent examples of cases where Third World groups have sought participatory status along with Western NGOs oes Aguas del Tunari, supra note 9;
26. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limitedv. United Republic of Tanzania, (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22) Procedural Order No. 5;
27. and Sues, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A, and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19) [Suez], On the geographical locations of transnational NGOs
28. see Kathryn Sikkink and Jackie Smith, "Infrastructures for Change: Transnational Organisations, 1953-93", in Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, supra note 8, p. 24.
29. See Odumosu, supra note 4.
30. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962);
31. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess. Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974).
32. On the meaning of'framing' in social movement theory, see David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest", in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClung Mueller (eds.) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (1992) p. 133 at 136. For the authors, framing "denotes an active, processderived phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction."
33. See also, David A. Snow and, Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilisation", in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi and Sidney Tarrow (eds.) From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures (1988) p. 197.
34. Bruno Barras, "Life Projects: Development our Way", In Mario Blaser, Harvey A. Feit and Glenn McRae (eds.), In the Way of Development: Indigenous Peoples, Life Projects and Globalisation" (2004) p. 47 at 50.
35. See Suez, supra note 15.
36. See Alvarez and Park, supra note 3, p. 394, stating that "[q]uite understandably, arbitrators do not normally see themselves as guardians of the public interest."
37. For a critique of statehood see Obiora Chinedu Okafbr, Re-defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa (2000);
38. Makau wa Mutua, "Why Redraw the Map of Africa?; A Moral and Legal Inquiry", 16 Michigan Journal of International Law (1995) p. 1113.
39. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, (26 December 1933), 165, LNTS 19;
40. James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed., 2006) p. 52.
41. Anne Orford, "The Uses of Sovereignty in the New Imperial Order", 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal (1996) p. 63 at 72.
42. On the substantive nature of statehood, see Hilary Charleswordi and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (2000) p. 170. In certain circumstances, equating the state with the people might yield negative results.
43. See for example, Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania (ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2), 14 ICSID Rev.-FILJ (1,999) p. 197.
44. See article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention, supra note 5.
45. See generally, Ibrahim Shihata, Toward a Greater Depoliticisation of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA (1993).
46. For an Insightful interpretation of arbitral awards in light of the public/private divide, see Amr Shalakany, "Arbitration and, the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias under the Specter of Neoliberalism", 41 Harvard, International Law Journal (2000) p. 419.
47. Other areas of international law have witnessed some changes due to the interactions of social movements widi international institutions. Examples include the movement to interpret the WTO TRIPS Agreement in a manner that allows better access to HIV/AIDS drugs (Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health WT/MIN7(01)/Dec/2 para,. 4 (Nov. 14, 2001)), and responses to pressure like the establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel.
48. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. u Italy), I.C.J. Reports 1989 p. 65 [ELSI]. In the ELSIcase, the World Court concluded, that Italy was not in breach, of its international obligations even in the face of the government's responses to popular protests.
49. See generally, Erik J. Woodhouse, "The 'Guerra del Agua' and the Cochabamba Concession: Social Risk and Foreign Direct Investment in Public Infrastructure", 39 Stanford Journal of International Law (2003) p. 295.
50. Aguas del. Tunari, supra note 9.
51. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/l) 5 ICSID Rep. (2002) p. 209 [Metalclad].
52. Tecnias Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/02), 43 I.L.M. (2004) p. 133 [Tecmed].
53. Teemed, id. at para. 129. While social pressure is generally unacceptable as a rationale for adopting regulatory measures, in some (limited) instances, environmental regulation will not be considered as regulatory taking. Thomas Walde and Abba Kolo, "Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 'Regulatory Taking' in International Law", 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2001) p. 811.
54. Id. at para. 108.
55. See Shalakany, supra note 28.
56. Cecilia Lynch, "Political Activism and the Social Origins of International Legal Norms", in Cecilia Lynch and Michael Loriaux (eds.), Law and Moral Action in World Politics (2000) pp. 140, 142.
57. On "strategic social construction", see Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 13.
58. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 6.
59. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, approved by the UN General Assembly, 15 December 1976, (1976) 15 I.L.M. 701.
60. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, "International Law and Social Movements: Challenges of Theorising Resistance", 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2003) p. 397 at 400.