Finding social dilemma: West of Babel, not east of Eden

Public Choice

Volumn 135, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 55-66

  Wagner, Richard E ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Emergent theorizing; Gordon Tullock; James Buchanan; Social dilemma; Social networks; Spontaneous order

Indexed keywords

EID: 39749178269     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9247-9     Document Type: Article

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