Hybrid revenue caps and incentive regulation

Energy Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 688-695

  Lantz, Björn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Incentive regulation; Revenue caps

Indexed keywords

COST FUNCTIONS; COSTS; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; PROFITABILITY;

INCENTIVE REGULATION; REVENUE CAPS;

EARNINGS;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; FIRM SIZE; INCENTIVE; MONOPOLY;

EID: 39749112535     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2006.09.003     Document Type: Article

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