What is extreme cruelty? Judicial review of deportation cancellation decisions for victims of domestic abuse

Vanderbilt Law Review

Volumn 60, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1815-1846

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EID: 39549109487     PISSN: 00422533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (205)

1. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25-27 (1993) (addressing the "rising tide of violence" directed against American women).
2. See Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture's Diminishment, but Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 153, 162-65 (2004).
3. See S. REP. No. 104-249, at 2-4 (1996) (discussing the drain on social welfare created by illegal immigration and the availability of jobs as the primary magnet for most illegal immigrants). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRALRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997) (codified at 8 U.S.C § 1182 (2000)), was enacted in part to monitor illegal immigration more stringently.
4. See also Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the Constitution's Most Important Human Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions Under the REAL ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2006) (calling the enactment of the IIRAIRA Congress's "tough stand" on illegal immigration).
5. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2000).
7. See infra Part IV A.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(1).
9. Id. § 1229a(a)(1).
10. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) (2007).
11. See infra Part III.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
13. See, e.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals, operating as a delegate of the Attorney General, acted within its authority in construing the term "extreme hardship" under federal deportation provisions);
14. Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1012-13 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the discretionary nature of an "extreme hardship" interpretation precludes subsequent court review of that interpretation);
15. Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Attorney General's determination of "extreme hardship" is "clearly a discretionary act").
16. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 834-35 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that determinations requiring the application of law to fact, including whether an immigrant has been subjected to battery, are non-discretionary, and therefore reviewable by the courts).
17. Id. at 834.
18. See Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 983 (10th Cir. 2005) (" '[E]xtreme cruelty' is just the sort of non-algorithmic decision that requires a non-reviewable 'judgment call' by the Attorney General.");
19. see also Wilmore v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006) (describing and agreeing with the Tenth Circuit's characterization).
20. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 106(a) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (repealed 1996));
21. see Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1955) (holding that enactment of the INA rendered the Administrative Procedure Act's judicial review provisions applicable to deportation decisions).
22. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149; see INA § 106(a).
23. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C);
24. see Leiderman, supra note 3 ("Congress has periodically adjusted the judicial review scheme for removal orders to rein in perceived abuses of the system by non-citizens attempting to delay their removal from the United States."). Congress also passed other legislation to toughen the country's stance on illegal immigration, including section 440(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.), which "precluded from judicial review the final deportation orders of noncitizens deportable for certain criminal convictions."
25. Leiderman, supra note 3, at 1370.
26. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149 (noting the "specific repeal of the judicial review procedures" previously available under INA § 106).
27. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 306, 110 Stat, at 3009-607 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
28. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149, 1152.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) ("[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review [any decision] the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . .").
30. Leiderman, supra note 3, at 1367 (quoting REAL ID § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) (as codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (amending INA § 242(a)(2)(D)))).
31. See Calvo, supra note 2, at 162-63 (noting Congress's recognition that "the legal system historically failed to address violence against women with appropriate seriousness," and its resolve that the nation's law "must change").
32. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 37-38 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
33. S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 30-31 (1990).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
35. See S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 37.
36. Id. ("In homes where there is domestic violence, children are abused or seriously neglected at a rate 1500 percent higher than the national average.").
37. Id.
38. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41-42 (1993).
39. See id. at 42.
40. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 27 (1993).
41. Lauri J. Owen, Commentary, Forced Through the Cracks: Deprivation of the Violence Against Women Act's Immigration Relief in San Francisco Bay Area Immigrant Domestic Violence Survivors' Cases, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 13, 16 (2006)
42. (citing Karyl Alice Davis, Comment, Unlocking the Door by Giving Her the Key: A Comment on the Adequacy of the U-visa as a Remedy, 56 ALA. L. REV. 557, 557 (2004)).
43. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3083 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 60 (2000) (statement of Leslye Orloff, Director, Immigrant Women Program, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
44. Calvo, supra note 2, at 165.
45. Id. Moreover, the exceptions that allowed for an alien spouse to "self-petition" for resident status were narrow.
46. Id. at 156-57.
47. See id. at 165 ("A battered spouse could be deterred from taking action to protect herself, such as filing for a civil protection order, filing criminal charges, or calling the police, because of the threat or fear of deportation.").
48. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (2000) (listing three exceptions under which an alien spouse could self-petition).
49. Calvo, supra note 2, at 167 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1, at 51, 78 (1990)).
50. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
51. Deanna Kwong, Removing Barriers for Battered Immigrant Women: A Comparison of Immigrant Protection under VAWA I & II, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 137, 137 (2002).
52. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, tit. IV, subtit. G, 108 Stat, at 1953;
53. see also Calvo, supra note 2, at 172-74 (discussing the section's reforms).
54. 8 U.S.CA. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II).
55. Id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iii), (v).
56. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2003) (giving deference, in a case concerning deportation, to an INS regulation defining the term "extreme cruelty").
57. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2007) (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(IV) (granting clemency to battered women and children seeking readmission to the United States);
59. id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii) (exempting battered women and children from the strictures of quotas for skilled and unskilled workers petitioning to come into the country);
60. U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007) (allowing forcancellation of a removal order for battered women and children); 8 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000) (preventing the government from making adverse immigration decisions based solely on evidence provided by batterers).
61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
62. See Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 2000 § 1503(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(BB) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (BB)) (alleviating the battered petitioner's burden of proof that the batterer was a U.S. citizen);
63. see also Kwong, supra note 42, at 145-48 (providing an in-depth analysis of Congress's attempt to make self-petitioning easier for battered women under VAWA of 2000).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
65. 345 F.3d 824, 831-32 (9th Cir. 2003).
66. Id. at 827.
67. Id. at 830.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 831.
70. Id. at 828 (emphasis supplied by the court).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 841.
73. Id. at 835.
74. Id. at 834.
75. The other circuit courts have yet to rule on this issue.
76. 429 F.3d 977, 980-81 (10th Cir. 2005).
77. Id. at 980.
78. Id. at 981-84.
79. Id. at 982.
80. Id. (quoting Sabido Valdivia v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 2005)).
81. Id. at 982-83.
82. Garnica-Villarreal v. Ashcroft, 123 F. App'x 625, 626-27 (5th Cir. 2005).
83. Id. at 626.
84. Id. at 626-27.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 455 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2006).
88. Id. at 526.
89. Id. at 525.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (Supp. V 2005).
91. See id. at 526-29 (discussing the consensus among the circuits that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000 & Supp. V 2005), which otherwise strips the courts of jurisdiction to review decisions regarding the granting of relief, does not curtail jurisdiction over purely legal questions).
92. Id. at 528.
93. Id.
94. Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2003).
95. See id. at 835-37.
96. Id. at 829-30.
97. Id. at 830-31.
98. Id. at 829-31.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 827, 829.
101. Id. at 829-30.
102. Id. at 834.
103. Id.
104. See Mental Health-Alcoholism, http://www.mayochnic.com/health/ alcoholism/DS00340 (last visited Nov. 9, 2007) (discussing physical dependence on alcohol as a characteristic of alcoholism);
105. see also Cynthia Mascott, An Introduction to Alcoholism (Oct. 4, 2006), http://psychcentral.com/lib/2006/alcoholism-and-its-treatment (distinguishing social drinkers from alcoholics on the basis of physical dependence).
106. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., NCJ 160972, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT ix (1996) (finding that expert testimony on battering and its effects is admissible, at least to some degree, in each of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia, with three quarters of the states allowing such testimony to prove that a woman is a battered woman).
107. Hernandez, 345 F. 3d at 836.
108. Id. (quoting Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1993)).
109. Id. at 836-37
110. (quoting Dutton, supra note 94).
111. Id. at 837
112. (quoting Dutton, supra note 94).
113. See Bess Rothenberg, The Success of the Battered Woman Syndrome: An Analysis of How Cultural Arguments Succeed, 17 SOC. F. 81, 81 (2002) (calling battered woman syndrome the "most recognized explanation for why abusive relationships continue").
114. See LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55-70 (1980) (discussing the three stages and the repetitive nature of the cycle).
115. See id. at 42-54 (discussing the psychosocial theory of learned helplessness, in which battered women learn and believe over time that no matter what their reaction to the violence is, the battery will not stop, even though to others it seems like the women could escape).
116. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 368 (N.J. 1984) (determining that expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome is admissible to help establish a claim of selfdefense in a homicide case).
117. See id. at 375-77 (discussing the relevance of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in establishing the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury).
118. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 92, at iv, x (1996) (noting the common criticism of the defense as "tantamount to an acquittal");
119. Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 70-87 (1994) (criticizing battered woman syndrome as patriarchal and hurtful to women);
120. David L. Faigman, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 622 (1986) (arguing against the admission of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome to support a self-defense claim);
121. Norman J. Finkel, Haute Couture, Poorly Tailored Crimes, and Ill-Fitting Verdicts, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 173, 183-208 (2003) (debating the proper legal use of battered woman syndrome).
122. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 92 (finding that over three quarters of the states have found expert testimony admissible to prove the defendant is a battered woman).
123. For one of the first and most well known cases allowing expert testimony about battered woman syndrome to support a claim of self-defense in a homicide case, see Kelly, 478 A.2d at 368.
124. Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 836 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing scholarship pertaining to battered woman syndrome, including Mary Ann Dutton, supra note 94, and Evan Stark, RePresenting Women Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 985-86 (1995)). The court's refusal to limit itself by using the term "battered woman syndrome" is consistent with a report from the Department of Justice, which found a "strong consensus among the researchers, and also among the judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys interviewed for the assessment, that the term "battered woman syndrome' does not adequately reflect the breadth or nature of the scientific knowledge now available concerning battering and its effects." DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 92, at i-ii.
125. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J) (2000) (applying the "any credible evidence" standard to aliens making allegations of abuse by a U.S. citizen).
126. See Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 838-40 (noting that no court had yet interpreted the meaning of "extreme cruelty," and therefore looking to principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and agency interpretation).
127. See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26 (1993), which enumerates Congress's intent that VAWA be interpreted to remedy the effects of past gender bias and ignorance to survivors of domestic violence).
128. See id. at 827, 838-40 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26, and noting that the INS definition of extreme cruelty carries out congressional intent and complies with clinical understandings of domestic violence).
129. Id. at 836, 838-39.
130. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 22-24 (advocating that judges receive training to handle cases involving domestic abuse more effectively, given the history of insufficient law enforcement efforts in domestic abuse cases).
131. Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 836 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 24).
132. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26.
133. Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 838-39 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26).
134. Id. at 839.
135. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2007)).
136. Id. at 838.
137. Id. at 836-37, 840.
138. Id. at 840.
139. Id. at 834, 839-40 (combining "Congress's goal of protecting battered immigrant women" and the "clinical understanding of domestic violence" to conclude that patterns of extreme violence constitute, objectively, "extreme cruelty")-
140. See id. at 833-34 (discussing Congress's inclusion of "battery" and "extreme cruelty" as alternatives of one another, and acknowledging the "clearly factual determination" that applies to questions of battery).
141. Id. at 833-34.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 834 (quoting Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1997)).
144. Id. at 833-34 (discussing Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1151).
145. Id. at 835.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Ninth Circuit also engaged in statutory construction in order to distinguish "extreme hardship" and "extreme cruelty." The court cited a provision, now repealed, which specifically left extreme hardship provisions to the Attorney General: "a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship."
148. Id. at 834-35 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), 1254(a)(3), repealed by IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997)).
149. Id. at 840.
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Guzman, 744 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (E.D. Wash. 1990)).
152. See Wilmore v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006);
153. Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 981-82 (10th Cir. 2005).
154. 429 F.3d at 981-82.
155. Id. at 981.
156. Id. at 980.
157. Id. at 983.
158. Id. at 982.
159. Id. (quoting Morales Ventura v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2003)).
160. Id. at 982-83.
161. Id. at 982.
162. Id. at 982-83.
163. Id. at 983.
164. Id. at 984.
165. Id. (quoting the petitioner's brief and the INS definition, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2007)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 983 (citing Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003)).
168. See id. at 981 (noting that the petitioner's testimony concerning marital rape was not credible, and that otherwise she only alleged abuse that consisted of "insults, name calling, and use of derogatory language").
169. See id. at 983 (analyzing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
170. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (2000) (limiting judicial review of determinations made by the Attorney General under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2) regarding asylum applications); Wilmore v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006) (interpreting the interaction between the provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), the "jurisdiction-stripping provision," and 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), the "battered spouse provision").
171. 429 F.3d at 983.
172. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's use of the legislative history of VAWA, see supra PartIII.A.1.b.
173. Wilmore, 455 F.3d at 528.
174. Id. at 527-28.
175. Id. at 525-26.
176. Id. at 526.
177. Id. (quoting Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 215-16 (5th Cir. 2003)).
178. Id. at 528-29.
179. Id. at 528.
180. Id. (quoting Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 984 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting the INS definition of "extreme cruelty" defined in 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi))).
181. Id. (quoting Perales-Cumpean, 429 F.3d at 982).
182. Id. at 527 (quoting Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1013 (5th Cir. 1999)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 528-29 (explaining that "the Real ID Act removes jurisdictional bars to direct review of questions of law in final removal, deportation, and exclusion orders" (citing INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (Supp. V 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
185. Id. at 529.
186. See Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), certain categories of individuals, "including habitual drunkards. . . [and] anyone who at any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony," are per se considered not to have the good moral character required under the extreme hardship provision).
187. 8 U.S.CA. § 1229b(b)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
188. Compare U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring nonpermanent residents seeking cancellation of removal under the extreme hardship provision to have been physically present in the United States for ten years), with id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring only three years of physical presence in the United States for nonpermanent residents seeking cancellation of removal under the extreme cruelty provision).
189. INA § 244(a)(1) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed 1996)).
190. See 8 U.S.CA. § 1229b(b)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007). IIRAIRA also increased the physical presence requirement from seven years to ten, added the "no convictions" requirement, and made the alien show "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" instead of just "extreme hardship." Overall, the IIRAIRA made it more difficult to win a reprieve under this provision. See INA § 244(a)(1) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed 1996)) (detailing the previous requirements for an alien to qualify for cancellation of deportation pursuant to the extreme hardship provision.)
191. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1151; see also Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[A] statutory direction to determine the presence or absence of good moral character requires the fact finder to weigh and balance the favorable and unfavorable facts or factors, reasonably bearing on character, that are present in the evidence.").
192. 8 U.S.CA. § 1101(f).
193. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1151.
194. See Sep-lveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2005) (denying a motion to dismiss petitions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) because a BIA decision holding that a petitioner was precluded from establishing that he was a person of "good moral character" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) is reviewable).
195. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2000).
196. 8 U.S.CA. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
197. See Sepulveda, 407 F.3d at 62-63 (holding that courts have "jurisdiction to review nondiscretionary decisions regarding an alien's eligibility for relief under the hardship principle, and noting that other circuits have held that "judicial review of nondiscretionary, or purely legal, decisions regarding an alien's eligibility for § 1229b relief" is not barred).
198. See 8 U.S.CA. § 1229b(b)(2). Note that "extreme hardship" is one of the elements of the battered spouse provision. Id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v).
199. See Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 840 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[D]efining extreme cruelty to encompass 'abusive actions' that 'may not initially appear violent but that are part of an overall pattern of violence,' [the INS definition] protects women against manipulative tactics aimed at ensuring the batterer's dominance and control." (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2007))).
200. See LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 6-7 (2002) (stating that batterers often replicate their abusive behavior toward their spouses in their interactions with their children).
201. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
202. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001).
203. Id. at 320 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)).
204. See infra Part IV.A.
205. See id.