On the elements and practices of monitoring

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 65, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 654-666

  Yang, Der Yuan ^a  

^a NATIONAL KAOHSIUNG UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Checks and balances; Early European trading company; Monitoring; Principal agent problem

Indexed keywords

EID: 39149084368     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.02.008     Document Type: Article

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