The acquired language of thought hypothesis: A theory of symbol grounding

Interaction Studies

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 125-142

  Viger, Christopher ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Acquired language of thought hypothesis; Content; Dual route model of vision; Interface; Language of thought; Presentation; Representation; Symbol; Symbol system

Indexed keywords

EID: 39049104399     PISSN: 15720373     EISSN: 15720381     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1075/is.8.1.08vig     Document Type: Conference Paper

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