Can principals identify effective teachers? Evidence on subjective performance evaluation in education

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 101-136

  Jacob, Brian A ^a   Lefgren, Lars ^b  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^b BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949210616     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/522974     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Aaronson, Daniel, Lisa Barrow, and William Sander. 2007. Teachers and student achievement in the Chicago public high schools. Journal of Labor Economics 25, no. 1:95-135.
2. Alexander, Elmore R., and Ronnie D. Wilkins. 1982. Performance rating validity: The relationship of objective and subjective measures of performance. Group and Organization Studies 7, no. 4:485-96.
3. Armor, David, Patricia Conry-Oseguera, Millicent Cox, Nicelma King, Lorraine McDonnell, Anthony Pascal, Edward Pauly, and Gail Zellman. 1976. Analysis of the school preferred reading program in selected Los Angeles minority schools. Report no. R-2007-LAUSD. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
4. Ballou, Dale. 2001. Pay for performance in public and private schools. Economics of Education Review 20:51-61.
5. Ballou, Dale, and Michael Podgursky. 2001. Teacher compensation: The case for market-based pay. Education Matters 1, no. 1:16-25.
6. Bolino, Mark C., and William H. Turnley. 2003. Counternormative impression management, likeability, and performance ratings: The use of intimidation in an organizational setting. Journal of Organizational Behavior 24, no. 2:237-50.
7. Bommer, William H., Jonathan L. Johnson, Gregory A. Rich, Philip M. Podsakoff, and Scott B. MacKenzie. 1995. On the interchangeability of objective and subjective measures of employee performance: A metaanalysis. Personnel Psychology 48, no. 3:587-605.
8. Bull, Clive. 1987. The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, no. 1:147-60.
9. Clotfelter, Charles T., Helen F. Ladd, and Jacob L. Vigdor. 2006. Teacherstudent matching and the assessment of teacher effectiveness. NBER Working Paper no. 11936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
10. Figlio, David N. 1997. Teacher salaries and teacher quality. Economics Letters 55, no. 2:267-71.
11. Figlio, David N., and Cecilia Elena Rouse. 2006. Do accountability and voucher threats improve low-performing schools ? Journal of Public Economics 90, nos. 1-2:239-55.
12. Figlio, David N., and Joshua Winicki. 2005. Food for thought: The effects of school accountability on school nutrition. Journal of Public Economics 89, nos. 2-3:381-94.
13. Hanushek, Eric A. 1986. The economics of schooling: Production and efficiency in public schools. Journal of Economic Literature 49, no. 3: 1141-77.
14. _. 1997. Assessing the effects of school resources on student performance: An update. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 19, no. 2:141-64.
15. Hanushek, Eric A., John Kain, Daniel M. O'Brien, and Steven G. Rivkin. 2005. The market for teacher quality. NBER Working Paper no. 11154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
16. Hanushek, Eric A., and Steven G. Rivkin. 2004. How to improve the supply of high quality teachers. In Brookings papers on education policy 2004, ed. Diane Ravitch. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
17. Harris, Douglas, and Timothy Sass. 2006. The effects of teacher training on teacher value-added. Working paper, Economics Department, Florida State University, Tallahassee.
18. Heneman, Robert L. 1986. The relationship between supervisory ratings and results-oriented measures performance: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology 39:811-26.
19. Heneman, Robert L., David B. Greenberger, and Chigozie Anonyuo. 1989. Attributions and exchanges: The effects of interpersonal factors on the diagnosis of employee performance. Academy of Management Journal 32, no. 2:466-76.
20. Jacob, Brian A. 2005. Accountability, incentives and behavior: The impact of high-stakes testing in the Chicago public schools. Journal of Public Economics 89, nos. 5-6:761-96.
21. Jacob, Brian A., and Lars Lefgren. 2005a. Principals as agents: Subjective performance measurement in education. NBER Working Paper no. 11463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
22. _. 2005b. What do parents value in education? An empirical investigation of parents' revealed preferences for teachers. NBER Working Paper no. 11494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
23. Jacob, Brian A., and Stephen D. Levitt. 2003. Rotten apples: An investigation of the prevalence and predictors of teacher cheating. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 3:843-78.
24. Kane, T., and D. Staiger. 2002. Volatility in school test scores: Implications for test-based accountability systems. In Brookings papers on education policy 2002, ed. Diane Ravitch. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
25. Lefkowitz, Joel. 2000. The role of interpersonal affective regard in supervisory performance ratings: A literature review and proposed causal model. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 73: 67-85.
26. Levin, Jonathan. 2003. Relational incentive contracts. American Economic Review 93, no. 3:835-57.
27. MacLeod, W Bentley. 2003. Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation. American Economic Review 93, no. 1:216-40.
28. MacLeod, W Bentley, and J. Malcomson. 1989. Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment. Econometrica 56, no. 2:447-80.
29. Medley, Donald M., and Homer Coker. 1987. The accuracy of principals' judgments of teacher performance. Journal of Educational Research 80, no. 4:242-47.
30. Morris, Carl N. 1983. Parametric empirical Bayes inference: Theory and applications. Journal of the American Statistical Association 78, no. 381: 47-55.
31. Moulton, Brent R. 1990. An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the effects of aggregate variables on micro units. Review of Economics and Statistics 72, no. 2:334-38.
32. Murnane, Richard. 1975. The impact of school resources on the learning of inner-city children. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
33. Murnane, Richard J., and D. K. Cohen. 1986. Merit pay and the evaluation problem: Why most merit pay plans fail and few survive. Harvard Educational Review 56, no. 1:1-17.
34. Prendergast, Canice. 1993. The role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 2: 523-34.
35. _. 1999. The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature 37, no. 1:7-63.
36. Prendergast, Canice, and Robert Topel. 1996. Favoritism in organizations. Journal of Political Economy 104, no. 5:958-75.
37. Peterson, Kenneth D. 1987. Teacher evaluation with multiple and variable lines of evidence. American Educational Research Journal 24, no. 2: 311-17.
38. _. 2000. Teacher evaluation: A comprehensive guide to new directions and practices. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin.
39. Reback, Randall. 2005. Teaching to the rating: School accountability and the distribution of student achievement. Working paper, Economics Department, Columbia University.
40. Rockoff, Jonah E. 2004. The impact of individual teachers on student achievement: Evidence from panel data. American Economic Review 94, no. 2:247-52.
41. Sanders, W. L., and J. C. Rivers. 1996. Cumulative and residual effects of teachers on future student academic achievement. Research report, University of Tennessee Value-Added Research and Assessment Center, Knoxville.
42. Sullivan, Daniel G. 2001. A note on the estimation of regression models with heteroskedastic measurement errors. Working Paper no. 2001-23. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
43. Varma, Arup, and Linda K. Stroh. 2001. The impact of same-sex LMX dyads on performance evaluations. Human Resource Management 40, no. 4:309-20.
44. Wayne, Sandy J., and Gerald R. Ferris. 1990. Influence tactics, affect, and exchange quality in supervisor-subordinate interactions: A laboratory experiment and field study. Journal of Applied Psychology 75, no. 5: 487-99.