Proximal intentions, intention-reports, and vetoing

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-14

  Mele, Alfred ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Action; Consciousness; Haggard; Intentions; Libet; Vetoing

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949208753     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080701867914     Document Type: Article

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