-
1
-
-
85036945877
-
-
All parenthetical page references in the text are to Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
-
All parenthetical page references in the text are to Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
38949190999
-
What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice
-
On bipolar normativity, see, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith Oxford: Clarendon
-
On "bipolar" normativity, see Michael Thompson, "What Is It to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle about Justice," in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 333-84.
-
(2004)
Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz
, pp. 333-384
-
-
Thompson, M.1
-
3
-
-
85036948672
-
-
Some moral rights may properly be understood to be inalienable, not subject to forfeit through voluntary acts of consent on the part of their bearer; examples might include the rights not to be enslaved or killed
-
Some moral rights may properly be understood to be inalienable, not subject to forfeit through voluntary acts of consent on the part of their bearer; examples might include the rights not to be enslaved or killed.
-
-
-
-
4
-
-
85036922747
-
-
See my Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
-
See my Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
85036920851
-
-
I discuss this issue in Reason and Responsibility, as reprinted in R. Jay Wallace, Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 123-43.
-
I discuss this issue in "Reason and Responsibility," as reprinted in R. Jay Wallace, Normativity and the Will: Selected Papers on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 123-43.
-
-
-
-
6
-
-
85036909640
-
-
I have in mind here the kind of constructivism about normativity developed most systematically by Christine Korsgaard; see her The Sources of Normativity Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996
-
I have in mind here the kind of constructivism about normativity developed most systematically by Christine Korsgaard; see her The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
85036909961
-
-
and Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy, in Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century, suppl. Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (2003): 99-122.
-
and "Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy," in "Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century," suppl. vol., Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (2003): 99-122.
-
-
-
-
8
-
-
0003867020
-
-
See, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
-
See T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
-
(1998)
What We Owe to Each Other
-
-
Scanlon, T.M.1
-
9
-
-
85036957769
-
-
See, again, the works by Christine Korsgaard cited in n. 6 above.
-
See, again, the works by Christine Korsgaard cited in n. 6 above.
-
-
-
|
