Guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer? The limits of plea bargaining when defendant guilt is uncertain

American Law and Economics Review

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 305-329

  Bjerk, David ^a  

^a CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949178438     PISSN: 14657252     EISSN: 14657260     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahm010     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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3. Friedman, Ezra, and Abraham L. Wickelgren. 2006. "Bayesian Jurors and the Limits to Deterrence," 22 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 70-86.
4. Gay, Gerald D., Martin F. Grace, Jayant R. Kale, and Thomas H. Noe. 1989. "Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence," 20 RAND Journal of Economics 196-213.
5. Grossman, Gene M., and Michael L. Katz. 1983. "Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare," 73 American Economic Review 749-57.
6. Miceli, Thomas J. 1990. "Optimal Prosecution of Defendants Whose Guilt is Uncertain," 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 189-201.
7. Png, I. P. L. 1986. "Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Error," 6 International Review of Law and Economics 101-5.
8. Reinganum, Jennifer F. 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," 78 American Economic Review 713-28.
9. Rubinfeld, Daniel L., and David E. M. Sappington. 1987. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," 18 RAND Journal of Economics 308-15.