When local models fail

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 3-24

  Epstein, Brian ^a  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cause; Corruption; Individualism; Model; Supervenience

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949174771     PISSN: 00483931     EISSN: 15527441     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0048393107310873     Document Type: Article

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