Mutual monitoring in a tradable water rights system: A case study of Zhangye City in Northwest China

Agricultural Water Management

Volumn 95, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 331-338

  Zhang, Jun Lian ^a   Zhang, Feng Rong ^a  

^a CHINA AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Irrigation area; Principal agent theory; Transaction costs

Indexed keywords

GROUNDWATER FLOW; IRRIGATION; WATER RESOURCES;

IRRIGATION AREA; PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY; TRANSACTION COSTS;

WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS;

GROUNDWATER FLOW; IRRIGATION; WATER RESOURCES; WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS;

IRRIGATION SYSTEM; WATER MANAGEMENT; WATER PLANNING; WATER RESOURCE; WATER SUPPLY; WATER USE;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; GANSU; ZHANGYE;

EID: 38949147448     PISSN: 03783774     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.agwat.2007.10.016     Document Type: Article

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