The ethics of belief: Doxastic self-control and intellectual virtue

Synthese

Volumn 161, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 403-418

  Audi, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief; Doxastic voluntarism; Evidence; Grounds; Intellectual virtue; Justification; Knowledge; Reasons; Self control; Testimony

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949120076     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9092-2     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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