Indicative and subjunctive conditionals

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 51, Issue 203, 2001, Pages 200-216

  Weatherson, Brian ^a  

^a SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 38949108037     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00224.x     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. H.P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Harvard UP, 1989), p. 63
2. D. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973)
3. and 'Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities', Philosophical Review, 85 (1976), pp. 297-315
4. repr. in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 11 (Oxford UP, 1986), pp. 133-56 (references to reprint)
5. F.Jackson, Conditionals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)
6. From S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 55
7. V. Dudman, 'Against the Indicative', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1994), pp. 17-26
8. An anonymous referee for The Philosophical Quarterly suggested this point
9. See Lewis, 'Anselm and Actuality', Noûs, 14 (1970), pp. 175-88
10. M. Davies and L. Humberstone, 'Two Notions of Necessity', Philosophical Studies, 38 (1980), pp. 1-31
11. F. Ramsey, 'General Propositions and Causality' (1929), in R. Braithwaite (ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics (London: Routledge, 1931), pp. 237-55
12. Lewis, 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow', Noûs, 13 (1979), pp. 455-76
13. See, e.g., A. Gibbard, 'Two Recent Theories of Conditionals', in W. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce (eds), Ifs (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), pp. 211-47
14. S. Barker, 'Material Implication and General Indicative Conditionals', The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 195-211
15. J. McCawley, 'Conversational Scorekeeping and the Interpretation of Conditional Sentences', in M. Shibatani and S. Thompson (eds), Grammatical Constructions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 77-101
16. There is an obvious similarity between this argument and some of the uses of contextual dependence in Lewis' theory of knowledge: see his 'Elusive Knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1996), pp. 549-67. Indeed, McCawley credits Lewis' 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow' as an inspiration for his ideas
17. R. Stalnaker, 'Assertion', in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. IX (New York: Academic Press, 1978), pp. 315-32
18. Stalnaker, 'A Defence of Conditional Excluded Middle', in Harper, Stalnaker and Pearce (eds), Ifs, pp. 87-104
19. Edgington, in her 'Lowe on Conditional Probability', Mind, 105 (1996), pp. 617-30, furnishes some good examples against the view that p □→ q should be false when there are several equally close p-worlds in a tie for closest and some are q-worlds but some are ¬q-worlds
20. See Edgington, 'On Conditionals', Mind, 104 (1995), pp. 235-327, for an endorsement of this position and discussion of others who have held it
21. I am indebted to Lloyd Humberstone for pointing this out to me
22. Jackson, 'Classifying Conditionals', Analysis, 50 (1990), pp. 134-47
23. J. Bennett, 'Farewell to the Phlogiston Theory of Conditionals', Mind, 97 (1988), pp. 509-27
24. and 'Classifying Conditionals: the Traditional Way is Correct', Mind, 104 (1995), pp. 331-54
25. Dudman, 'Against the Indicative'