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Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 14-36

What's wrong with moral internalism

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EID: 38949101185     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9329.00049     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (7)

References (11)
  • 1
    • 0004206765 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p.4. This, as with each of these arguments, has multiple locations in the literature. I should add that Dancy sees his position as ultimately only having 'an internalist flavour'
    • (1993) Moral Reasons , pp. 4
    • Dancy, J.1
  • 2
    • 60949405290 scopus 로고
    • Moral Reality and the End of Desire
    • Mark Platts, ed, London: Routledge and Keegan Paul
    • Mark Platts, 'Moral Reality and the End of Desire', in Mark Platts, ed., Reference, Truth and Reality (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1980), p.81
    • (1980) Reference, Truth and Reality , pp. 81
    • Platts, M.1
  • 3
    • 0003742241 scopus 로고
    • Oxford: Blackwell
    • Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 71
    • (1994) The Moral Problem , pp. 71
    • Smith, M.1
  • 4
    • 0043227691 scopus 로고
    • Operationalism and Ordinary Language
    • Paraphrasing Wittgenstein's metre-rule example, remark 50 in the Investigations. For an effective criticism of such neo-operationalism in its original domain of application see Jerry Fodor and Charles Chihara: 'Operationalism and Ordinary Language', American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4, (1965)
    • (1965) American Philosophical Quarterly , vol.2 , Issue.4
    • Fodor, J.1    Chihara, C.2
  • 5
    • 0039082320 scopus 로고
    • Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1979), p. 261; and passim in the Oxford Wittgensteinian-Aristotelian literature
    • (1979) Ways of Meaning , pp. 261
    • Platts, M.1
  • 6
    • 0004312818 scopus 로고
    • Oxford: Blackwell, and generally in the internalist literature
    • David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p. 141; and generally in the internalist literature
    • (1988) Moral Vision , pp. 141
    • McNaughton, D.1
  • 7
    • 0009386076 scopus 로고
    • Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?
    • 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?' Procedings of the Anstotelian Society Supplementary Vol. LII, 1978, p. 16
    • (1978) Procedings of the Anstotelian Society Supplementary , vol.52 , pp. 16
  • 8
    • 79955177794 scopus 로고
    • Brains and behaviour
    • See for example Hilary Putnam: 'Brains and behaviour' [1965] in: Challenges to Empiricism, ed. Harold Morick (London: Methuen 1980). The arguments of the next section can also be assimilated to certain anti-behaviourist counters
    • (1965) Challenges to Empiricism
    • Putnam, H.1
  • 10
    • 0004290119 scopus 로고
    • Oxford: Blackwell
    • See Phillipa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell 1978), p. 170
    • (1978) Virtues and Vices , pp. 170
    • Foot, P.1
  • 11
    • 79955311731 scopus 로고
    • March
    • A version of this paper was read at the St. Andrews 'Ethics and Practical Reasoning Conference' in March 1995. My thanks go out to the conference organisers and fellow participants; also to Steve Wilkinson, Jonathan Dancy, Richard Gaskin and Michael Morris for comments on an earlier, written, version
    • (1995) Ethics and Practical Reasoning Conference
    • Andrews, S.T.1


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