Bundled discounts, leverage theory, and downstream competition

American Law and Economics Review

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 370-383

  Simpson, John ^a   Wickelgren, Abraham L ^b  

^a FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38949092515     PISSN: 14657252     EISSN: 14657260     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahm009     Document Type: Article

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