Report on an empirical study of district variations, and the roles of judges, trustees and debtors' attorneys in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases

American Bankruptcy Law Journal

Volumn 81, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 431-470

  Norberg, Scott F ^a   Compo, Nadja Schreiber ^a  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 38949088930     PISSN: 00279048     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (138)

1. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 804 (1994)
2. [hereinafter, Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture];
3. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 503-504 (1993)
4. [hereinafter, Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy].
5. See also Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 559 (2001)
6. [hereinafter, Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education];
7. William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85 (1989);
8. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Laws, Models, and Real People:.Choice of Chapter in Personal Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 661, 693-700 (1988).
9. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1983-2003 Bankruptcy Filings, 12-month period ending June, by Chapter and District, http://www.uscourts.gov/ bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm#june.
10. U.S. Trustee Program, Chapter 13 Handbooks & Reference Materials, Chapter 13 Statistics, FY 1994-2006, Chapter 13 Trustee Audited Annual Reports, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/library/chapter13/index.htm.
11. See Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473 (2006)
12. [hereinafter Norberg & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13].
13. Id. at 505-508 & n. 70 (reporting on district pre-confirmation dismissal, post-confirmation dismissal and discharge rates in the seven districts covered by the Chapter 13 Project, and citing to other studies reporting on Chapter 13 discharge rates in various districts).
14. E.g., Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra note 1, at 817-828 & Tables 1-3.
15. See supra note 2.
16. See infra note 34 and accompanying text and Tables 5 and 6.
17. See Norberg & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 480 & n.11.
18. See id. at 483, 491-494.
19. See, e.g., Norberg & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 498-499, 507-509;
20. Sullivan et al. The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra note 1, at 804;
21. Brauchet, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 503-504;
22. William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 406 (1994)
23. [hereinafter, Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice].
24. "Local legal culture" refers to the variations in local legal practices that arise from the perceptions, attitudes and expectations of bankruptcy judges, trustees and attorneys in a particular locality. See Sullivan et al. The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra note 1, at 804;
25. Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 503-504.
26. See Sullivan et al. The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra, note 1, at 822-830 (reporting on and discussing variations among federal judicial districts in bankruptcy filing rates).
27. See supra note 2.
28. Id. See generally Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Cumbers, Thoughts on the "Local Legal Culture," The Case of Consumer Chapter Choice, Feb. 2002 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24 (reviewing data on the variation among districts and states in percentages of consumer debtors who choose Chapter 13 or Chapter 7);
29. Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Humbers, A Tale of Two Chapters, Part I, Aug. 2002 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (same);
30. Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Cumbers, Exploring the Demographics of Consumer Chapter Choice, May 1999 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (finding that the "percentage of chapter 13 filings in a state tends to vary directly with the number of filings per 1000 households in the state").
31. As discussed supra, notes 8-10 and accompanying text, the fact that most of the sample districts had a higher proportion of Chapter 13 filings than the national average did not detract from the representativeness of the Project sample. Rather, the representativeness of the sample was likely in part a result of the fact that the districts included in the sample accounted for a large proportion, nearly 20%, of all Chapter 13 filings in 1994.
32. Sullivan, et al. The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra note 1, at 833-839.
33. Neither the Schedules, Official Bankruptcy Form 6, nor the Statement of Financial Affairs, Official Bankruptcy Form 7, includes any direct question regarding homeownership. Homeownership was inferred from whether the debtor scheduled a mortgage or mobile home debt. Thus, the rate of home ownership reported here may be slightly understated because some debtors may have owned homes not subject to any mortgage, and some mortgage or mobile home creditors may not have been identifiable as such. 427, or 54%, of the cases indicated a mortgage or mobile home debt. We identified 16 mobile home debts in the Middle District of North Carolina, seven in the Northern District of Georgia, five in the Southern District of Georgia and one each in the District of Maryland and the Middle District of Tennessee. In the Middle District of Tennessee, we identified 42 debtors with mortgage debt, and further estimated that roughly 25 real estate mortgages were listed as priority instead of secured debts. The remaining 372 homeowners were identified as having mortgage debts. The 54% homeownership rate for the sample debtors compared to the national rate of homeownership in 1994 of 64%. Robert R. Callis, Current Housing Reports, Moving to America - Moving to Home Ownership: 1994-2002, U.S. Census Bureau (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/h121-03-1.pdf.
34. 1 (6, N = 795) = 67.09, p < .001. The homeownership rate in Middle District of Tennessee (33.0%) was lower than expected, and homeownership rates in Maryland (58%), the Middle District of North Carolina (57%) and the Western District of Pennsylvania (79.0%) were higher than expected. The significantly different homeownership rates among districts could be a function not of local legal culture, but of differences in state debt collections laws. The fact that the homeownership rates for the debtors in the Northern and Southern Districts of Georgia, and in the Middle and Western Districts of Tennessee, are almost identical tends to support the conclusion that state debt collection law, including mortgage foreclosure and homestead exemption laws, influence the proportion of Chapter 13 debtors who use Chapter 13 to deal with a debt secured by the debtor's home.
35. This figure includes approximately 25 cases in which mortgage debt apparently was listed as priority debt.
36. Univariate ANOVAs were conducted. The differences in the mean debt-income ratio across the seven districts were significant, F(6, 736) = 21.77, p < .001[0]. Cf. Sullivan et al. The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra note 1, at p. 836 (reporting that differences in debtors' debt-income ratios in ten districts in Texas, Illinois and Pennsylvania were statistically indistinguishable).
37. Debt-Income Ratio and Bankruptcy Filing Rates, by District Source: Administrative Office of the Courts, Annual Reports for 1990 (the closest year available for the Chapter 13 Project sample of 1994 cases), as reported in Sullivan, et al. The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra note 1, at 817-824 and Tables 1 and 2.
38. Actually, debtors in the Middle District of Tennessee had the second lowest debt-income ratios and the second and third highest consumer and Chapter 13 filing rates, respectively.
39. Again, univariate ANOVAs revealed that the variations in average net and gross annual household incomes across districts were statistically significant, F(6, 751) = 22.60, p < .001, and F(6, 753) = 27.19, p < .001, respectively.
40. See http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/bci_data/ median_income_table.htm (Executive Office for United States Trustees website, reporting Census Bureau data on median incomes for purposes of applying the means test under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)).
41. There were probably more other filings by the sample debtors than evidenced by the Project data. The Project data on other filings were drawn from the debtors' Statement of Financial Affairs and electronic searches of the PACER data base in each district. The PACER data bases have a limited reach back period, and debtors do not always report all previous filings in the Statement of Financial Affairs. See Norberg & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 496-499.
42. The PACER database for the Middle District of North Carolina reaches back only one year before the sample cases, compared to two or more years in the other six districts.
43. 2(6, N = 793) = 47.16, p < .001.
44. BAPCPA has placed new restrictions on serial filings. The Code now provides that the automatic stay will expire 30 days after filing when an individual debtor had another case that was pending within a year before the current filing, unless a party in interest files a motion to extend the stay and shows that the current filing was in good faith, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3); and that no stay will arise when the debtor had two or more cases pending within the year before filing the current case, again unless a party in interest files a motion to impose the stay and shows that the current filing was made in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4).
45. 2 (12, N = 772) = 26.34, p < .05.
46. Some debtors achieve a fresh start without completing a plan, because the breathing spell afforded by the automatic stay allows them to regain their financial footing and to catch up on mortgage or other secured debt defaults before the case is dismissed or converted. Other debtors may lose their home or other collateral, but the interval during which foreclosure and repossession are automatically stayed gives them needed time to make other arrangements. Meanwhile, some debtors who complete a plan and attain a discharge do not achieve a fresh start. Not all claims are discharged at the end of a Chapter 13 plan, and about 15% of all debtors who achieve a discharge file again for bankruptcy protection. Norberg & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment, supra note 4 at 504. See also Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 535-36 (discussing that Chapter 13 non completions are not necessarily failures).
47. Norberg & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 546 (reporting findings that "debtors who completed their plans paid greater amounts and percentages of their pre-bankruptcy debts than those whose cases were dismissed short of discharge.")
48. See id. at 546-548 (using discharge rates to evaluate various debtor characteristics and plan features);
49. Braucher, Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 1, at 563 (using plan completion to gauge efficacy of debtor education and other local practices).
50. See generally Norberg & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 506.
51. N = 77.
52. 2 (4, N = 717) = 49.71, p < .001.
53. See generally Norberg & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 505 & n. 70 (citing to findings regarding Chapter 13 debtor discharge rates in numerous other studies).
54. In the cases handled by two of the three Chapter 13 Trustees in the Western District of Tennessee, the standard fee was $1200, and in cases handled by the other trustee, located in a different geographical area, the standard fee was $700-$800.
55. See Braucher, Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 1, at 576 and 565 n. 59.
56. See id. at 574
57. See id. at 573-74.
58. See id. at 575.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
60. 2 and p values for each of the five comparisons. To control for alpha inflation after multiple tests, only adjusted p values were considered statistically significant. Statistical values for each of the five comparisons
61. 2 (2) = 6.95, p < .05. This finding is consistent with findings in several other empirical studies. See Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 1, at 579 [reporting finding that "[t]he completion rate among debtors in the trusteeships that used wage orders was much greater than in trusteeships that did not (50.1 percent to 26.9 percent)"];
62. Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 535.
63. Gordon Bermant & Jean Braucher, Making Post- Petition Mortgage Payments Inside Chapter 13 Plans: Facts, Law, Policy, 80 AM. BANKR. L. J. 261, 269, 276 (2006).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(c). See Bermant & Braucher, Maying Post-Petition Mortgage Payments Inside Chapter 13 Plans: Facts, Law, Policy, supra note 45, at 263-264 (discussing § 1326(c) and whether it authorizes plans, confirmation orders and local rules requiring payment of post-petition mortgage payments through the Chapter 13 trustee).
65. Due to the differences in homeownership rates between districts in the Project, we analyzed the data on district discharge rates by mortgage paid versus not paid through the trustee only for debtors who owned a home. For homeowners only, there were no significant differences in incidence of discharge between debtors who paid their post-petition mortgage payments through the trustee and those who did not. Accord, Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Humbers, Chapter 13: Who Pays the Mortgage?, June 2001 AM. BANKR, INST. J. 20, 21 (comparison of discharge rates among trusteeships that disbursed mortgage payments with trusteeships that did not do so failed to "support the conclusion that moving the ongoing mortgage payments through the trustee operation increases the rate of successful terminations."). Cf. Bermant & Braucher, Maying Post-Petition Mortgage Payments Inside Chapter 13 Plans: Facts, Law, Policy, supra note 45, at 272 (reporting that most Chapter 13 trustees that disburse post-petition mortgage payments "agree that [the practice] increases the probability of plan completion; the survey results cannot, however, count as objective proof of that relationship").
66. It is possible that payment of the mortgage through the trustee does not correlate with plan completion because some or many debtors with mortgages stop paying under their plans once the mortgage arrearage has been paid. Several standing trustees told us that more than a few debtors use Chapter 13 in this way. If the cases dismissed after paying the mortgage arrearage are excluded from the analysis, or counted as cases with successful outcomes, there might have been a positive, statistically significant relation between payment of the mortgage through the trustee and debtor success. However, it was not possible to distinguish these dismissals from other dismissals.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 329(a), (b).
68. Compare Braucher, Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 1, at 578 (reporting finding that plan completion rate increased by 1.6% for each $100 in attorneys fees, for a total positive effect from lowest to highest fee charged in the five districts of 10%).
69. We also collected data on the amount of attorneys fees paid by debtors to their attorneys in advance, as disclosed in the debtor's Statement of Financial Affairs, and on the amount to be paid under the plan. Unfortunately, the quality of these data was poor; much of them were missing, and the total of pre-bankruptcy fees and post-petition fees reportedly paid or to be paid often did not equal the standard fee amount. As a result, we were unable to reliably test our hypothesis that payment of a portion of the debtor's attorney fee after filing, under the plan, was positively correlated with debtor discharge. Anecdotally, we have heard the conjecture from several Chapter 13 trustees and bankruptcy judges. The premise is that the debtor's attorney is more likely to structure a workable plan where payment of fees depends upon the debtor performing her plan for a period of time after filing. See also Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 546-551 (discussing local practices regarding payment of attorney fees in Chapter 13 cases in four cities; noting that the debtors' attorneys had an incentive to make plan payments as large as possible where the district's standing chapter 13 trustee's policy was to make the first plan distributions to pay debtor's attorney).
70. See id. at 546-548 (noting that in light of established standard, "no-look" fees, primary competition among lawyers was in payments terms).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6).
72. § 105(a) provides that the court may "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of title 11."
73. Compare Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 1, at 577-578 (finding that use of moratoriums was negatively associated with plan completion, with a percentage effect of 30%).
74. See id. at 577 (noting that as of 1994, "San Antonio and Greensboro continued to resist low percentage plans (that pay unsecured creditors under 25 percent)" while "[i]n Fort Worth and Charlotte, most plans were for less than 25 percent, and in Sacramento plans were averaging 35 to 40 percent.");
75. Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed Choices - A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 178 (1997) (discussing varying district benchmarks regarding repayment of unsecured claims);
76. Sullivan, et al. The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra note 1 at 832-833;
77. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice, supra note 11, at 410-411.
78. Regarding a benchmark for plan length, at the time that the sample cases were filed, the Code provided that the standard length of a plan would be three years (unless unsecured creditors were to be paid in full in a shorter period), which period could be extended "for cause." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(1994). The Chapter 13 provisions expressly stating requirements for payment of unsecured claims, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)(the best interests test) and 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (the best efforts test), implicitly negate an interpretation of "cause" as including a set, minimum payment obligation beyond the best interests and best efforts requirements. See Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice, supra note 11, at 412-413 (suggesting that Chapter 13 debtors' attorneys in some districts have successfully challenged established benchmarks regarding payment of unsecured claims).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(1994). Under the BAPCPA amendments, debtors with above-median incomes are subject to a five-year commitment period. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(d)(2006).
81. As amended by BAPCPA, the Code now further mandates that debtors with incomes above the applicable median must commit to a five-year plan unless unsecured creditors will be paid in full under a shorter plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2006).
82. Because only seven cases in the Northern District of Georgia included specific plan lengths, the data from this district were excluded from the analysis concerning district-level differences in proposed length of plans.
83. F(5,574) = 8.00, p ≤ .001. Levene's test for heterogeneity of variance was significant, F(5,574) = 11.14, p ≤ .001; equality of the variance in proposed plan length should not be assumed across the districts. As a result, the post-hoc comparisons were completed using Dunnett's T3 test that does not assume equality of variances.
84. M = 51.31 months, SD = 11.25, SEM = .789.
85. M = 53.45 months, SD = 11.07, SEM = .568, t(409.6) = 2.196, p = .029. However, disposition was not significantly related to plan length, F(2,515) = 2.39, p = .093, when cases in which the debtor obtained a discharge were separately compared to cases that were dismissed after confirmation and to cases that were dismissed before confirmation. Cf. Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 1, at 574-576 ("[differences in proposed plan length do not appear to be a significant factor in explaining the different [discharge rates in the five cities covered by the study] because five-year plans are readily permitted in all of them.)"
86. See Norberg. & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 527.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
90. See also William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice, supra note 11, at 397, 405-06;
91. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 532 ("The reality is that chapter 13 trustees and judges in the four cities [studied] effectively deter 0% plans and keep most plans above a floor percent that is known to local practitioners.").
92. It should be noted, however, that in the Western District of Tennessee, the data on this point were missing in nearly 40% of the cases).
93. It is not possible to say whether 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)(B) influenced many debtors with regard to the formulation of a proposed distribution to unsecured creditors. That section provides in part that a debtor is not eligible for a Chapter 7 discharge if she has received a discharge in a Chapter 13 case commenced within six years before the Chapter 7 filing, unless the debtor paid at least 70% of unsecured claims and the plan was proposed in good faith and was the debtor's best effort. Only in the Western District of Tennessee was there a notable percentage of debtors (15.2%) who proposed 70% plans.
94. 2 = .040. See also Norberg & Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, supra note 4, at 523-526;
95. Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, supra note 1, at 409-411 (reporting large variations among districts as to proposed distributions to unsecured creditors);
96. Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 532 (study of practices in four districts, finding "floor" percentage of 100% in one, and 10 % in one, and 25-33% in one, and 70% in another).
97. (M = 31.7%, SEM = 4.28).
98. Also, debtors in the District of Maryland proposed to pay a significantly higher percentage on unsecured claims (M = 61.3%, SEM = 6.75). However, this observation is based on only 37 of 100 cases.
99. 2(4, N=565)=6.872, p=.143.
100. See Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 1, at 577 (concluding that "there is no apparent pattern of connection between [district norms regarding percentage distribution to unsecured creditors] and completion rates [in the five trusteeships covered by the empirical study]").
101. But see William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice, supra note 11, at 410-12).
102. In addition, the United States Trustee, Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court and creditors' attorneys may play important parts in Chapter 13 cases. The Chapter 13 Project did not collect any data that permit evaluation of their roles.
103. There were approximately 325 bankruptcy judges and 160 standing Chapter 13 trustees in the United States in 1994. Thus, our sample represented 7.7% of all judges and 8.8% of all trustees
104. See Sullivan et al. The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra note 1, at 841-847;
105. Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 556, 580-81.
106. See Sullivan et al. The Persistence of Local Legal Culture, supra note 1, at 841-847.
107. All cases in which judges were either unknown or had fewer than 11 cases were excluded from the statistical analyses.
108. 2 = .19 We then conducted a series of non-parametric chi-square tests for each of the seven districts.
109. 2 (6) = 14.85, p < .05.
110. 2 (6)= 15.65, p < .05.
111. 2 (8) = 18.07, p < .05.
112. One trustee handled all of the cases for each of the judges in the single-judge divisions whose case outcomes were significantly different than another judge's or other judges' case outcomes in the same district. Thus, it was difficult to disentangle the influence of the judge from the influence of the trustee. However, because we found no significant differences in case outcomes among any of the trustees within a district when they handled cases for more than one judge, it seems likely that it was the judge and not the trustee that exerted the decisive influence when the outcomes in the cases handled by a particular judge and trustee were significantly different than the outcomes in cases handled by another judge (and trustee). See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
113. 2 (2) = 10.18, p < .00.
114. 2 (2) = 6.87, p < .05.
115. 2 (2)= 11.16, p < .00.
116. See also Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 536 (reporting that three of four standing Chapter 13 trustees did not scrutinize budgets for feasibility);
117. Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed Choices - A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 195 (1997) (reporting that "[s]ome chapter 13 trustees make sure that debtors have budgeted enough to live on, as part of a feasibility review.").
118. See also Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L. J. 461, 474-475 (1997).
119. But see Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 177, 204 (1986) (stating the local bankruptcy judge carefully assessed feasibility of proposed Chapter 13 plans).
120. The combination of lower discharge rate and higher pre-confirmation dismissal rate reported in Table 20 for the Western District of Tennessee may have been a function of the very high numbers of serial filers there. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text and Figure 1.
121. See also Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 556 (concluding that "Chapter 13 standing trustees have great potential influence" on local legal culture).
122. See Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education, supra note 1.
123. See Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 556-559.
124. In the Western District of Tennessee, one judge's cases were split between two standing trustees.
125. See supra note 86.
126. Specifically, in the District of Maryland, there were no significant differences in discharge rates for the cases that Chapter 13 Trustee Cosby administered before either of two judges. The same was true for Trustee Lackey, who also administered cases before the other two judges. In the Middle District of Tennessee, there was no significant difference in the discharge rates between the different judges whose cases were administered by the one standing Chapter 13 trustee. In the Northern District of Georgia, the discharge rates did not significantly differ as between any of the three judges whose cases were assigned to Trustee Bone. Nor did any significant differences occur in the distribution of discharge rates for Trustee Brown in the cases before the two judges whose cases she served. Finally, there were no significant differences in discharge rates in the Western District of Tennessee for trustee (now Judge) Emerson in cases before two judges, and similarly no differences for Trustee Stevenson in the cases that he handled before either of two judges.
127. Compare TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 23 (1989) (of 1529 Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filings in 1981, 62 debtors (4.05%) were pro se, with most from one district with a nonlawyer "clinic" (later closed) advising these debtors). Pro se debtors are more common in Chapter 7 cases because they are generally simpler than Chapter 13 cases.
128. 2(2) = 46.27, p < .001.
129. The BAPCPA amendments make bankruptcy filings more difficult and complicated, and thus even fewer pro se Chapter 13 debtors can be expected to confirm and complete a plan and obtain a discharge under the new law. See e.g, 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2006) (requiring individual debtors to obtain credit counseling before filing); § 521 (requiring significant additional debtor duties and paperwork). This result undercuts the wisdom of the BAPCPA requirement that debt relief agencies disclose to debtors that they might not need an attorney. See 11 U.S.C. § 527(b) (2006).
130. 2-test) and the fact that it compares cell means, the large difference in sample sizes does not explain the significant differences between the groups.
131. All p's > .05.
132. In her empirical study of lawyers and consumer bankruptcy, Professor Braucher likewise classified consumer bankruptcy law practices as either high- or low-volume. She noted that "high-volume lawyers devote all or most of their time to bankruptcy work, while the low-volume lawyers usually devote substantial time to one or more other practice areas." Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 519.
133. Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Heed Hot be Futile, 2007 U. III. L. REV. 93, 95 ("The consumer debtor bar is likely to consolidate as a result of the 2005 Act.... In a sign of predicted trends, a continuing legal education session at the 2005 annual meeting of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges was devoted to "How to Run a 'Mill' Ethically and Effectively")
134. F(6,787) = 7.66, p < .01.
135. 2 (6) = 43.74, p < .001.
136. Some of the BAPCPA amendments may have the effect of reducing the number of lower-volume practitioners, and further concentrating the representation of debtors in higher-volume practices, because the amendments make filing for bankruptcy more complicated and expensive, and impose greater obligations and potential liabilities on debtors' attorneys. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 526, 527 (as amended 2005).
137. 2(1) = 4.61, p< .05.
138. p > .05.