The transaction cost theory of the nonprofit firm: Beyond opportunism

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 5-18

  Valentinov, Vladislav ^a  

^a LEIBNIZ INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES IAMO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Information cost; Nonprofit firm; Opportunism; Transaction cost

Indexed keywords

EID: 38849203214     PISSN: 08997640     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0899764007300408     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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