Wartime process: A dialogue on congressional power to remove issues from the federal courts

California Law Review

Volumn 95, Issue SPEC. ISS., 2007, Pages 1243-1288

  Choper, Jesse ^a   Yoo, John ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38849149674     PISSN: 00081221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (203)

1. See generally RICHARD FALL0N, JR., DANIEL MELTZER & DAVID SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
2. [hereinafter HART & WECHSLERJ 331-34 (5th ed. 2003).
3. See e.g., Robert Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984);
4. Robert Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (1986).
5. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 330-45.
6. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896-97 (1984).
7. See HART & WECHSLER supra note 1, at 321-22.
8. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
9. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
10. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
11. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005)
12. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd).
13. Pub. L. No. 109-163, Div. A, Title XIV, § 1405(e)(2)(A), Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3476, 3479
14. (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801).
15. Id. at § 1405(e)(2)(C)(i)-(ii).
16. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762-69 (2006).
17. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
18. This language in Section 7 of the MCA amends 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and will be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1).
19. See Pub. L. No. 109-366, Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat 2600.
20. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1.
21. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS ch. 2 (1980).
22. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
23. Id. at 779.
24. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-84.
25. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769.
26. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2.
27. Eisentraer, 339 U.S. at 777-78.
28. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (When "Congress sanctionfs] . . . trials of enemy aliens by military commission for offenses against the law of war ... the Executive branch of the government could not, unless there was suspension of the writ [of habeas corpus], withdraw from the courts the duty and power to [inquire into whether] the Constitution or laws of the United States withhold authority to proceed with the trial").
29. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
30. As Justice Kennedy, "following] the framework of Eisentrager," noted in his concurring opinion, "Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory." Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
31. According to the Court, "[p]etitioners contend that they are being held in federal custody in violation of the laws of the United States. No party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' custodians. Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more. We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base." Id. at 483 (footnotes and citations omitted).
32. Id. at 484 n. 15.
33. See John Yoo, National Security and the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1144, 1166 (2006).
34. These policies are discussed in JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2006).
35. See Yoo, supra note 27, at 1167.
36. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769.
37. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
38. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81.
39. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 337-42 (discussing congressional power over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction).
40. See, e.g., Paul Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030-31 (1982) (arguing that it would "make nonsense of the Madisonian Compromise to hold that "the only power to be exercised is the all-or-nothing power to decide whether none or all of the cases to which the federal judicial power extends need the haven of a lower federal court").
41. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 246-47 (1971) (arguing that Congress must create lower federal courts and vest them with the full possible jurisdiction).
42. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 319 ("It has traditionally been understood that certain claims under federal law...permit but do not require judicial determination. Pursuant to its Article I powers, Congress may provide or withhold original federal jurisdiction to decide such claims").
43. See Bator, supra note 36, at 1030.
44. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1868).
45. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (habeas corpus action holding that a military tribunal in Indiana, where civil courts were available, lacked jurisdiction to try a citizen for conspiring to aid the Confederacy).
46. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 328.
47. Lauf v. E.G. Shinner, 303 U.S. 323.
48. Ex Parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
49. See Richard D. Rosen, Civilian Courts and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-Martial, 108 MIL. L. REV. 5, 19 (1985).
50. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
51. 74 U.S. at 515 (holding that "The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised.").
52. Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
53. Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 180 (1960).
54. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659-61 (1996).
55. Cf. Martin Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982).
56. Lauf, 303 U.S. at 330.
57. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
58. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981).
59. Id. at 67.
60. WILLIAM DURER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126-80 ( 1980).
61. Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1510 (1987).
62. See note 22 and accompanying descriptions.
63. Braden v. 30th Judicial District, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (overruling decision on which Eisentrager had relied).
64. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) ("our rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment [in Eisentrager] was emphatic").
65. Compare HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 37 (2006 Supp.) (Eisentrager "did not make wholly clear whether it meant to hold that the petitioner had no right to habeas corpus review at all or that he had no substantively valid claim to relief.").
66. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529-35 (2004).
67. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 11
68. (citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S 1, 28 (1942)).
69. See supra text accompany notes 54-59.
70. See Lawrence Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress ' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
71. See Clinton, supra note 1, at 749-50 (concluding that "Congress [must] allocate to the federal judiciary as a whole each and every type of case or controversy" within the scope of Article III, "excluding, possibly, only those cases that Congress deemed to be so trivial that they would pose an unnecessary burden.").
72. See Akhil Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985);
73. Akhil Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990);
74. Akhil Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1651 (1990).
75. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333-34 (1816).
76. Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, discussed in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 320.
77. See United States v. More, 8 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805);
78. see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 321.
79. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73, 85), discussed in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 320, 466.
80. Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65 (1953).
81. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 48, at 201-02 (arguing that to be constitutionally valid, "exceptions" to the Court's appellate jurisdiction must not "negate" the Court's "essential constitutional functions of maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law").
82. See JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS ch. 2 (1980).
83. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
84. Hunter 's Lessee, 14 U.S. at 348.
85. Id.
86. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178-80 (1803).
87. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 114-267.
88. See Bator, supra note 36, at 1037;
89. Redish, supra note 50, at 155-56.
90. Bator, supra note 36, at 1037.
91. Id. at 1039.
92. Id.
93. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
94. See e.g., Ratner, supra note 48, at 201-02.
95. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932);
96. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
97. See, e.g., John Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, Treaties, Legislative Power, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999).
98. For a more complete discussion of these functional problems with judicial participation in foreign affairs cases, see Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 169-70.
99. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27. U.S. 253 (1829) (recognizing doctrine of non-self-executing treaties).
100. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793-98.
101. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS (2006).
102. MCA Section 5(a)
103. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note).
104. See Pub. L. No. 109-366, Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat 2600.
105. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (rational basis test for denying aliens welfare benefits).
106. Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953).
107. See note 22 and accompanying descriptions..
108. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
109. For "judicial suggestions that Congress cannot preclude judicial review of constitutional issues," see Richard Fallon, Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1088 (1998)
110. and id. n.108:
111. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (construing a statute not to foreclose judicial review 'in part to avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim'
112. (quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)));
113. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1974);
114. see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.2 118 (2d ed. 1992) (concluding that "[d]espite the dearth of case law on the issue, dicta in several cases and scholarly analysis suggest strongly that there is a constitutional right to judicial review of constitutional issues raised by agency action.");
115. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.6, at 482-83 (3d ed. 1991) (terming it the "clear implication" of Supreme Court authority that "there is a constitutional right of review of constitutional issues and characterizing the opposing view as 'constitutional heresy'").
116. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 272 (3d ed. 2000).
117. In my view, one of the Court's major goals in generating intellectually coherent legal principles should be to produce rules that, in application, will work as forcefully as attainable to constrain judges from inserting their own ideological beliefs into constitutional decision making in ad hoc, unreasoned ways.
118. Sanford Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication - A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 340 (1957).
119. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 42-48 (1976)
120. (refusing to apply the right to counsel rule of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), to summary court-martial proceedings).
121. Hart, supra note 70, at 1394.
122. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989).
123. Richard Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 974 (1988).
124. Laurence Claus, The One Court That Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
125. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-148 §§ 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (2005).
126. Detainee Treatment Act, § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i).
127. Id.
128. Detainee Treatment Act, § 1005 (e)(2)(C)(ii).
129. I do not think that federal courts should intervene in separation of power disputes or federalism disputes, mainly because these constitutional issues may be trustworthily resolved within the political process, but also in order to husband their institutional capital to protect personal liberties. CHOPER, supra note 15, chs. 4-5.
130. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529-35 (2004).
131. Id. at 538.
132. See Yoo, supra note 27, at 1159 (criticizing the Hamdi Court's application of the Mathews balancing test to the wartime context).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
134. Fallon, supra note 95, at 1083.
135. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 1284-85.
136. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
137. For a somewhat earlier statement, see Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963) (commenting that construing a statutory change "to derogate from the traditional liberality of the writ. . . might raise serious constitutional questions.").
138. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289.
139. Id. at 301.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 304-05.
142. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
143. Id. at 658-63.
144. Id. at 664.
145. 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
146. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 341 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 438-39.
149. The brief record of the Philadelphia proceedings is discussed in Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 608-16.
150. Rex Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 340-41 (1952).
151. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
152. Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the United States - 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 248-49 (1965).
153. See also David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 62 (2006) ("[T]he contemporary history, both during the Convention and after, turns out to be more ambiguous, and to leave the present-day observer -perhaps even a dyed-in-the-wool originalist - uncertain.").
154. Daniel Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1610-11 (1990).
155. This view is developed by Eric Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It Doesn't Make It So: Ex parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531 (2000).
156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Habeas was "provided for, in the most ample manner, in the plan of the convention.");
157. FEDERALIST NO. 84 (discussing the Constitution's "establishment of the writ of habeas corpus").
158. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 74 (1824).
159. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
160. Robert C. Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 19, 13, 29 (Robert Post ed. 1991).
161. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, Sect. 14, 1 Stat. 81.
162. Id.
163. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3 states that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post fact Law shall be passed."
164. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
165. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
166. Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
167. Id. at 93.
168. Id. at 95.
169. See id. at 93-94 (stating that "for the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law; but the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law").
170. See id. at 95.
171. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, Sect. 7, 4 Stat. 634.
172. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539.
173. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, Sect. 1, 14 Stat. 385.
174. Shapiro, supra note 131, at 63 ("that the writ is in fact guaranteed by implication ... is ... for me the most plausible reading of Chief Justice Marshall's somewhat cryptic discussion in Ex Parte Bollman");
175. Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 581 (2002) ("Bollman does not suggest that Congress could abrogate the privilege of the writ without violating the Constitution");
176. Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 877 (1994) (Marshall's position was "that the Suspension Clause obligated Congress to make the writ available").
177. See supra Part III.
178. Hart, supra note 70, at 1397.
179. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 304, n.24.
180. Freedman, supra note 133, at 541;
181. see also Paschal, supra note 128, at 641-49.
182. James Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1436 (2000).
183. In further support, see the carefully qualified conclusion (especially, but not only, the phrase in parentheses) that "the original understanding of the writ's function would argue (albeit not conclusively) against reading the Suspension Clause as conferring a constitutional right to postconviction review," in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 1291.
184. Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 179 (2006).
185. Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863).
186. Id. at 253.
187. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8.
188. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
189. Id.
190. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948).
191. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
192. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co. 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948).
193. JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS ch. 5 (1980).
194. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948) (Congress's war power may continue after cessation of hostilities to remedy problems created by the war).
195. Jesse Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1497-99 (2005).
196. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380 (1948).
197. See text accompanying supra note 24.
198. Contra, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir 2007).
199. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 636-37.
200. Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 170 (citations and footnote omitted).
201. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
202. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 2.
203. Accord, Hart, supra note 70, at 1398.