Relative rewards within team-based compensation

Labour Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 141-167

  Irlenbusch, Bernd ^a   Ruchala, Gabriele K ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bonus Pools; Cooperation; Experiments; Motivation Crowding Out; Personnel Economics; Relative Rewards; Teamwork; Voluntary

Indexed keywords

EID: 38849143747     PISSN: 09275371     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2007.02.003     Document Type: Article

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