Constitutional humility

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 23-53

  Gerhardt, Michael J ^a,b  

^a Department of Constitutional Law ^*

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 38849087347     PISSN: 00096881     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (201)

1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice of the United States).
2. Id. at 55-56.
3. Id. at 158.
4. Id. at 371.
5. Id. at 158.
6. Jan C. Greenburg, Roberts Sworn in as Chief, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2005, at Cl.
7. Sara Lin, Roberts Stresses Courts' Independence, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A l8.
8. Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More Consensus on Court, N. Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at A16.
9. Shrinking Suprmes, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2006, at 34.
10. For Americans' opinions as to the Supreme Court, see generally The Gallup Poll: The Supreme Court, http://www.galluppoll.com/content/default.aspx?ci=4732 (last visited June 4, 2007).
11. But see Philip Kennicott, Judge Not: In the Court of Public Opinion, the Bench is the Hot Seat, WASH. POST, May 17, 2005, at C1 (arguing that many Americans want judges to act as dispensers of "frontier justice").
12. FELIX FRANKFURTER WITH HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 301 (1960).
13. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
14. Id. at 144.
15. Id. at 155-56.
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. 187 U.S. 606 (1902).
18. Id. at 607.
19. Id. at 608.
20. 198 U.S. at 53.
21. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 75-76.
23. Richard Polenberg, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 91, 91 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
24. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 469-70 (1998).
25. See Polenberg, supra note 23, at 91.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 92.
28. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act) ("The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.").
29. Phillippa Strum, Louis Dembitz Brandeis, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 39, 40.
30. Id.
31. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 463 (1931) ("If by operations at the dam any then perfected right of Arizona, or of those claiming under it, should hereafter be interfered with, appropriate remedies will be available.").
32. Strum, supra note 28, at 40.
33. See Int'l News Servs. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede a determination of the limitations which should be set upon any property right in news or of the circumstances under which news gathered by a private agency should be deemed affected with a public interest.").
34. Strum, supra note 28, at 40.
35. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 238 (1920) ("And, as this court has so often said, the high prerogative of declaring an act of Congress invalid, should never be exercised except in a clear case.").
36. Strum, supra note 28, at 41.
37. See Ashwander v. Term. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 315-317 (1936).
38. Strum, supra note 28, at 41.
39. See 297 U.S. at 341-42 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
40. 297 U.S. at 347.
41. See Strum, supra note 28, at 41.
42. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. 285 U.S. at 311.
45. See Strum, supra note 28, at 41.
46. 272 U.S. 52, 176-77(1926).
47. Id. at 240 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
48. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 51 (1994).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 549.
51. Hand's distaste for judicial review and the constitutional recognition of substantive due process claims is most ably summed up in his 1958 lectures at Harvard University. See id. at 654-57.
52. See Id. at 239, 274.
53. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 32 (1991).
54. 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949).
55. PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION xiii (1971).
56. Id. at 5.
57. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
58. Id. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 649 (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 650.
62. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 20 (2005).
63. Id. at 18.
64. Id. at 18-19.
65. Id. at 19-20.
66. Id. at 20.
67. Id. at 21.
68. Id. at 11.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 7-8.
71. Mat 11-12, 17-18.
72. Id.
73. 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74. LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY 313 (1984).
75. 295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935).
76. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
77. See id at 631-32.
78. 295 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1935).
79. Id. at 601-02.
80. 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing in dissent that a Minnesota statute prohibiting any interference with the military enlistment effort violated the rights of freedom of speech, privacy, and religion).
81. 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing in concurrence that "[f]ear of serious injury" was insufficient justification for punishing freedom of speech).
82. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
83. Id. at 474, 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
84. G. Edward White, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 226, 230.
85. Id. at 230.
86. 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
87. 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I think that at least it is safe to say that the most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the ground for interference is very clear.").
88. White, supra note 76, at 227.
89. Id. at 230.
90. See Frew v. Bowers, 12 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1926) (concurring in a judgment to strike down a provision of the 1921 Revenue Act as violating the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause);
91. Seelig v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp 776 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 293 U.S. 522 (1934) (striking down New York law that prescribed minimum prices New York dealers could pay milk producers as violating the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. GUNTHER, supra note 40, at 656-57.
94. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
95. 347 U.S. at 483.
96. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
97. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
98. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
99. BAKER, supra note 66, at 456.
100. Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2399 (2006)
101. (reviewing BREYER, supra note 54).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2400.
104. Id. at 2402-03.
105. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
106. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
107. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
108. McConnell, supra note 91, at 2409.
109. Justice Cardozo, who attended Columbia Law School appears to be the notable exception.
110. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47IND. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1971) ("Courts must accept any value choice the legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a choice made in the framing of the Constitution.").
111. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 353 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice of the United States).
112. Id. at 441 (statement of Senator Charles E. Schumer).
113. Id. at 448 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice of the United States).
114. For an excellent interview discussing several of these aspects, see Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 104.
115. See id.
116. Lin, supra note 7, at Al 8.
117. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-The Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 372, 377 (2006).
118. The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 420, 423 (2005). Of course, the unanimity of the Court, in any given year, may have at least as much to do if not more to do with the nature of the cases selected than with the Chief Justice's efforts to cultivate unanimity.
119. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, supra note 107, at 372.
120. In their second year on the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined an opinion upholding an as applied challenge to the constitutionality of section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
121. Four years earlier, the Court rejected a facial challenge to the federal law in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
122. In the more recent case, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito maintained that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to outlaw corporations and nonprofit organizations from purchasing political advertisements about issues (rather than particular candidates) at stake in upcoming elections. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2673.
123. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, supra note 107, at 377.
124. These figures decreased to 88.9% for Alito, 78.6% for Scalia and a mere 35.7% for Stevens when non-unanimous cases are considered. Id. at 374-75.
125. Id. at 378.
126. See Nine Justices, Ten Years: A Statistical Retrospective, 118 HARV. L. REV. 510, 520 (2004).
127. Compare The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, supra note 107, at 372, with The Supreme Court, 2004 Term, supra note 108, at 420.
128. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, supra note 107, at 372.
129. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2006).
130. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)
131. (upholding the federal partial-birth abortion law in spite of the fact that the Rehnquist Court had struck down a similar state law in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)).
132. 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 249.
134. Id. at 252.
135. Id. at 253-54.
136. Id. at 275.
137. Id. at 294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
139. Id. at 2216.
140. Id. at 2235 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
141. Id. at 2236.
142. Id. at 2222.
143. To be sure, it is also possible that he wrote a concurrence to illustrate how the Bakke-like 4-1-4 split "readily . . . could have been avoided" by a small adjustment on Justice Kennedy's part. Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). This would further support Roberts's notions of uninamity and rule-making (a la Chief Justice Marshall) as opposed to separating his legal conclusions from Scalia's.
144. Compare Posting of Mark Moller to Cato @ Liberty, http://www.cato-atliberty.org /2006/06/19/rapanos-raich-and-agency-discretion (June 19, 2006, 15:27 EST), with Posting of Jonathan Adler to Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.eom/posts/l 151445835.shtml (June 27, 2006, 18:03 EST).
145. 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
146. See id. at 2167.
147. See Thayer, supra note 13.
148. In fairness to Thayer, his work predates the rise of the modern administrative state, so it is not particularly surprising that his work in the late nineteenth century does not address certain interpretative issues.
149. This point is ably made through Senator Schumer's use of movie analogies during the confirmation hearings. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 378 (statement of Charles E. Schumer, Senator).
150. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (criticizing the conclusions reached by Justice Brennan's and Justice O'Connor's interpretations of "tradition").
151. Id.
152. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. But see Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 158 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice of the United States) ("And, yes, there will be times when either the executive branch or the legislative branch exceeds the limits of their powers under the Constitution or transgresses one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, and then it is emphatically the obligation of the courts to step up and say what the Constitution provides, and to strike down either unconstitutional legislation or unconstitutional Executive action.").
154. Id. at 251 ("Given my view of the role of a judge ... the notion of dramatic departures is not one that I would hold out much hope for.").
155. Id. at 159.
156. Id. at 178.
157. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (2d ed. 1986).
158. Cf. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 153 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice of the United States) (comparing the role of former Justice Jackson before and after his appointment to the Court).
159. Id. at 158.
160. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
161. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
162. Frank M. Coffin, Reclaiming a Great Judge's Legacy, 46 ME. L. REV. 377, 391 (1994) (reviewing GUNTHER, supra note 40).
163. GUNTHER, supra note 40, at 301.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 301-02.
166. Sheldon M. Novick, Judged by History: What Makes a Great Judge-His Reasoning or His Vision?, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1994, at 2 (book review).
167. Michael E. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 171, 176.
168. Id. at 175.
169. Id. at 176.
170. Id. at 177.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 9 (2007).
174. Parrish, supra note 153, at 176.
175. Id. at 177.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 176.
178. Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 2, on file with author).
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id. at 4.
181. Id. at 5.
182. Id.
183. When Senator Grassley asked whether "there [is] any room in constitutional interpretation for the judge's own values or beliefs," Roberts replied, "No, I don't think there is. . . . It's their understanding of the law that will shape their decision." Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 178.
184. Major League Baseball, Official Baseball Rules, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/ official_info /official_rules/ foreword.jsp (last visited June 4, 2007).
185. See Major League Baseball, Official Baseball Rules 9.01(b), http://mlb.mlb.com/ mlb/official_info/ official_rules/umpire_9.jsp (last visited June 4, 2007) ("Each umpire is the representative of the league and of professional baseball, and is authorized and required to enforce all of these rules.") (emphasis added).
186. Senator Biden obliquely references this point by, stating, "So, as much as 1 respect your metaphor, it is not very apt because you get to determine the strike zone. . . . Your strike zone on reasonable or unreasonable may be very different from another judge's view of what is reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure." Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 185 (statement of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Senator).
187. See Major League Baseball, Official Baseball Rules: General Instructions to Umpires, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/ official_rules/umpire_9.jsp (last visited June 4, 2007) ("You no doubt are going to make mistakes, but never attempt to 'even up' after having made one.").
188. Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 114 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice of the United States) ("I do think that it is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent.").
189. During his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that precedent should be evaluated vis a vis its ability to produce a "workable rule," "settled expectations," and possible erosion of the "bases of the precedent," mirroring the language in Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 181.
190. See id. at 164-65.
191. Chief Justice Roberts suggested this idea in his confirmation hearing through citing Justice Jackson's Youngstown framework. See id. at 152-53.
192. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 209 (2006).
193. ROSEN, supra note 159, at 8.
194. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In his hearings, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that Brown was, in reality, a very modest decision because of the legal arguments advanced on both sides. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 409 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice of the United States).
195. Memorandum from John Roberts, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to Kenneth W. Starr, Counselor to the Attorney General (Nov. 24, 1981), available at http://www.archives.gov/ news/john-roberts/accession-60-88- 0498/028-gray-binderl/folder028.pdf.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 110 (1961);
198. Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of Education, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 7, 15.
199. 358 U.S. 1, 26 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
200. In a direct question by Senator Grassley as to when the Court can act under the Constitution when other branches fail to act, Chief Justice Roberts replied, "[I]t is not the job of the Court to solve society's problems . . . ." Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 178.
201. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).