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Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 266-283

On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting, and transferring of jobs

Author keywords

Linear waiting cost; Merging; Queuing; Scheduling; Splitting; Transferring

Indexed keywords

LINEAR WAITING COST; SPLITTING;

EID: 38549166362     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: 15265471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1060.0239     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (38)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.