A note on Kripke's footnote 56 argument for the essentiality of origin

Ratio

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 262-275

  Cameron, Ross P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38549099511     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00289.x     Document Type: Note

References (6)

1. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), p. 114, Fn56
2. Nathan Salmon, 'How Not to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference', Journal of Philosophy, LXXVI(12) (1979), p. 709
3. See David Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 252-253
4. For although I am my body, I might not have been, since the bodily counterpart relation is not the personal counterpart relation. See David Lewis 'Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies' in his Philosophical Papers 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 47-54
5. Josh Parsons, 'Must A Four-Dimensionalist believe in Temporal Parts?' Monist, 82 (2000), pp. 399-418
6. Richard Cartwright, 'Scattered Objects', in his Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 171-186