Resource management using untrusted auctioneers in a grid economy

e-Science 2006 - Second IEEE International Conference on e-Science and Grid Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages

  Bubendorfer, Kris ^a   Thomson, Wayne ^a  

^a VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE; COMPUTER SOFTWARE; PERSONAL COMPUTERS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

AUCTION PROTOCOLS; BID VALUES; RESOURCE RESERVATION SYSTEMS; UNTRUSTED AUCTIONEERS;

GRID COMPUTING;

EID: 38449121112     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/E-SCIENCE.2006.261158     Document Type: Conference Paper

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