Economics of copyright collecting societies

IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law

Volumn 38, Issue 8, 2007, Pages 937-957

  Handke, Christian ^a   Towse, Ruth ^b  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38449096867     PISSN: 00189855     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (99)

1. S.M. BESEN & S.N. KIRBY, "Compensating Creators of Intellectual Property - Collectives that Collect" 1 (The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA 1989). In contrast to publishers and production companies - which often commercialise copyrights of many right holders/creators simultaneously - collecting societies do not own copyrights themselves.
2. R.E. CAVES, "Creative Industries - Contracts Between Art and Commerce" (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2000); M. EINHORN, "Music Licensing in the Digital Age", in: R. TOWSE (ed.), "Copyright in the Cultural Industries" 165-77 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2002).
3. R. WATT, "Copyright and Economic Theory - Friends or Foes?" (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2000).
4. See M. FICSOR, "Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights" (World Intellectual Property Organisation, Geneva 2003) for a detailed survey of the legal aspects of collective management of copyrights.
5. A fundamental problem with incomplete enforcement of copyright can be illustrated by a simple example of right holders that consistently enforce licence payments from one set of users while they consistently do not enforce payment from another set that supply the same market. In this situation, all other things being equal, copyright enforcement would simply ruin those users that are forced to pay royalties, to the benefit of those users who escape payment.
6. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; S.M. BESEN, S.N. KIRBY & S.C. SALOP, "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives", 78:1 Virginia Law Review 383-411 (1992).
7. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; A. HOLLANDER, "Market Structure and Performance in Intellectual Property: The Case of Copyright Collectives", 2 International Journal of Industrial Organization 199-216 (1984); TOURNIER & JOURBERT, "Collective administration and competition law", 3 Copyright 96-103 (1986).
8. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; HOLLANDER, supra note 7; WATT, supra note 3.
9. R. MERGES, "Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Organizations", 84:5 California Law Review 1293-1393 (1996).
10. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; WATT, supra note 3.
11. R. WALLIS, C. BADEN-FULLER, M. KRETSCHMER Sc G.M. KLIMIS, "Contested Collective Administration of Intellectual Property Rights in Music - The Challenges to the Principles of Reciprocity and Solidarity", 14:1 European Journal of Communication 5-35 (1999); WATT, supra note 3.
12. HOLLANDER, supra note 7; BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; BESEN, KIRBY & SALOP, supra note 6; MERGES, supra note 9; WATT, supra note 3. For criticism of the justification in terms of transaction costs and an overview over alternative justifications see A. KATZ, "The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: New Technologies and the Future of Collective Administration of Copyrights", Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 1(3), 541-593 (2005); see also KRETSCHMER, "The Failure of Property Rules in Collective Administration: Rethinking Copyright Societies as Regulatory Instruments", 24 European Intellectual Property Review (EIPR) 126-137 (2002); and SNOW & WATT, "Risk Sharing and the Distribution of Copyright Collective Income", in: TAKEYAMA, GORDON & TOWSE (eds.), "Developments in the Economics of Copyright: Research and Analysis" 23-36 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2005).
13. Ensuring that these services are available to users and that right holders are compensated may even be done under a compulsory licence, under which no permission from the right holder needs to be obtained for some types of use hut that entitles the author to remuneration (GALLAGHER, "Copyright Compulsory Licensing and Incentives", in: R. TOWSE (ed.), "Copyright in the Cultural Industries" 85-98 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2002)). CCS provide the organisation that makes such payments possible through collective administration by distributing remuneration revenues to its members.
14. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; WATT, supra note 3; KATZ, supra note 12.
15. Or a narrow range of national territories in the case of the Scandinavian Nordic Copyright Bureau (WALLIS ET AL, supra note 11).
16. A notable exception is the case of ASCAP and BMI in the USA.
17. WATT, supra note 3.
18. BESEN & KIRBV, supra note 1.
19. A. PEACOCK & R. WEIR, "The Composer in the Marketplace" (Faber, London 1975); H.L. MACQUEEN & A. PEACOCK, "Implementing Performing Rights", 19:2 Journal of Cultural Economics 157-175 (1995).
20. HOLLANDES, supra note 7; BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; BESEN, KIRBY & SALOP, supra note 6.
21. HOLLANDER, supra note 7.
22. S. MATSUMOIO, "Performers in the Digital Era: Evidence from Japan", in: R. TOWSE (ed.), "Copyright in the Cultural Industries" 196-209 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2002).
23. R. TOWSE, "Creativity, Incentive and Reward: an Economic Analysis of Copyright and Culture in the Information Age" (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2001).
24. It seems the equivalent point can be made for right holders of relatively low-value copyright works who might not find any users at a single price for the entire repertoire set by the CCS to maximise overall revenues for all its members.
25. WATT, supra note 3.
26. HOLLANDER, supra note 7; BESHN & KIRBY, supra note 1; WATT, supra note 3, TOWSE, supra note 23.
27. HOLLANDER, supra note 7.
28. M. KRETSCHMER, G.M. KLIMIS & R. WALLIS, "The Changing Location of Intellectual Property Rights in Music: A Study of Music Publishers, Collecting Societies and Media Conglomerates", 17:2 Prometheus 163-186 (1999); HOLLANDER, supra note 7.
29. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; WATT, supra note 3.
30. BESEN, KIRBY & SALOP, supra note 6.
31. R. TOWSE, "Cultural Industries," in: R. TOWSE (ed.), "A Handbook of Cultural Economics" 170-177 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2003); CAVES, supra note 2.
32. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1.
33. WATT, supra note 3.
34. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; BESEN, KIRBY & SALOP, supra note 6.
35. H. LEIBENSTEIN, "Bandwagon, Snob and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand", 65:2 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 183-207 (1950).
36. EINHORN, supra note 2.
37. MATSUMOTO, supra note 22.
38. WATT, supra note 3.
39. BESEN & KIRBY, swpra note 1, at 82.
40. Id., at 83.
41. WATT, supra note 3.
42. MERGES, supra note 9.
43. S. LIEBOWITZ, "MP3s and Copyright Collectives: A Curse Worse than the Disease?," in: L.N. TAKEYAMA, W.J. GORDON & R. TOWSE (eds.), "Developments in the Economics of Copyright: Research and Analysis" 37-59 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2005).
44. S. LIEBOWITZ, "The Impacts of Cable Retransmission on Television Broadcasters", Canadian Journal of Economics 503-524 (August 1982).
45. WALLIS ET AL., supra note 11.
46. Id.; HOLLANDER, supra note 7.
47. MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, "Performing Rights - A Report on the Supply in the UK of the Services of Administering Performing Rights and Film Synchronization Rights" (HMSO, Monopolies and Mergers Commission, London 1996).
48. F. ROCHELANDET, "Are Copyright Collecting Societies Efficient? An Evaluation of Collective Administration of Copyright in Europe," in: W.J. GORDON & R. WATT (eds.), "The Economics of Copyright - Developments in Research and Analysis" 176-98 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2003).
49. WATT, supra note 3; SNOW & WATT, supra note 12.
50. Id.
51. MACQUEEN & PEACOCK, supra note 19; R. TOWSH, "Copyright and Economic Incentives: An Application to Performers' Rights in the Music Industry", 52 Kyklos 369-390 (1999); WALLIS ET AL., supra note 11; KRETSCHMER ET AL., supra note 28; M. KRETSCHMER, "The Failure of Property Rules in Collective Administration: Rethinking Copyright Societies as Regulatory Instruments", 24 European Intellectual Property Review (EIPR) 126-137 (2002 b); A. GAYER & O. SHY, "Publishers, Artists, and Copyright Enforcement", 18 Information Economics and Policy 374-384 (2006); V. OKSANEN & M. VÄLIMÄKI, "Music Collecting Societies and Webcasting", presented at the Second Annual Conference of the Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues Annual Congress, USA (June 2003), available at http://www.valimaki.com/org/serci_2003. pdf.
52. ROCHELANDET, supra note 48.
53. C. CRAMPES, D. ENCAOUA & A. HOLLANDER, "Competition and Intellectual Property in the European Union" (Unpublished paper, Université de Toulouse 2005); MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, supra note 47.
54. BESEN, KIRBY & SALOP, supra note 6.
55. TOWSE, supra note 51; WALLIS ET AL., supra note 11; KRETSCHMER, supra note 51; GAYER & SHY, supra note 51.
56. GAYER & SHY, supra note 51.
57. WALLIS ET AL., supra note 11; KRETSCHMER, supra note 51.
58. TOWSE, supra note 23.
59. WALLIS ET AL., supra note 11.
60. R. TOWSE, "The Singer or the Song? Developments in Performers' Rights from the Perspective of a Cultural Economist", forthcoming in Review of Law and Economics (2007).
61. ROCHELANDET, supra note 48; BESEN & KJRBY, supra note); BESEN, KIRBY & SALOP, supra note 6.
62. ROCHELANDET, supra note 48.
63. MERGES, supra note 9.
64. KRETSCHMER, supra note 51.
65. WATT, supra note 3.
66. BESEN, KIRBY & SALOP, supra note 6.
67. MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS COMMISSION, supra note 47.
68. WALLIS ET AL., supra note 11.
69. M. KRETSCHMER, "Copyright Societies Do Not Administer Individual Rights: The Incoherence of Institutional Traditions in Germany and the UK", in: R. TOWSE (ed.), "Copyright in the Cultural Industries" 140-164 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2002a).
70. WALLIS ET AL., supra note 11; KRETSCHMER, supra note 69; to some extent also KATZ, supra note 12.
71. TOWSE, supra note 23.
72. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC), "Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright" (Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ management/study-collectivemgmt_en.pdf; EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP), "Report on the Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2005 on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online music services (2005/737/EC)" (European Parliament, Brussels and Strasbourg 2007), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2007-0053+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
73. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1.
74. Also HOLLANDER, supra note 7.
75. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1.
76. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; BESEN, KIRBY & SALOP, supra note 6; MERGES, supra note 9.
77. EC Directive on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property, 92/100/EEC (Luxembourg 1992). TOWSE, supra note 23.
78. KATZ, supra note 12; C. GRABER, C. GOVONI, M. GIRSBERGER & M. NENOVA (eds.), "Digital Rights Management - The End of Collecting Societies?" (Stämpfli, Berne 2005).
79. KRETSCHMER, supra note 69.
80. CAVES, supra note 2; TOWSE, supra note 23.
81. MERGES, supra note 9; EINHORN, supra note 2; KATZ, swpra note 12.
82. MERGES, supra note 9.
83. Id.
84. EINHORN, supra note 2.
85. OKSANEN & VÄLIMÄKI, supra note 51.
86. A. SNOW & R. WATT, "Risk Sharing and the Distribution of Copyright Collective Income", in: L.N. TAKEYAMA, W.J. GORDON & R. TOWSE (eds.), "Developments in the Economics of Copyright: Research and Analysis" 23-36 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2005).
87. W. BAUMOL, "Applied Welfare Economics", in: R. TOWSE (éd.), "A Handbook of Cultural Economics" 20-31 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2003).
88. EINHORN, supra note 2.
89. WALLIS ET AL., supra note 11.
90. See e.g. KRETSCHMER ET AL., supra note 28.
91. ROCHELANDET, supra note 48.
92. BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 1; EINHORN, supra note 2; CAVES, supra note 2; TOWSE, supra note 23; KRETSCHMER (2002b), supra note 51; ROCHELANDET, supra note 48.
93. J. FARCHY, "Internetculture," in: R. TOWSE (ed.), "A Handbook of Cultural Economies" 276-280 (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2003).
94. EC, supra note 72.
95. MERGES, supra note 9.
96. SNOW & WATT (2005), supra note 12.
97. EINHORN, supra note 2.
98. WALLIS ET AL., supra note 11.
99. KRETSCHMER, supra note 51.