Legitimate political authority and the duty of those subject to it: A critique of Edmundson

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 399-435

  Lefkowitz, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

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EID: 3843095160     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:LAPH.0000015416.13155.ed     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (76)

1. Robert Paul Wolf, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?", Yale Law Journal 82 (1973); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) and The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
2. Robert Paul Wolf, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?", Yale Law Journal 82 (1973); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) and The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
3. Robert Paul Wolf, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?", Yale Law Journal 82 (1973); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) and The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
4. Robert Paul Wolf, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?", Yale Law Journal 82 (1973); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) and The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
5. Robert Paul Wolf, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?", Yale Law Journal 82 (1973); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) and The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
6. Robert Paul Wolf, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?", Yale Law Journal 82 (1973); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) and The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
7. William A. Edmundson, "Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation", Law and Philosophy 17/1 (1998), pp. 43-60, Three Anarchical Fallacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law's Claim to Authority", Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 15/1 (2002), pp. 51-67. Others who have pursued this strategy include Christopher Heath Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation", Ethics 111/4 (2001), pp. 735-759; Allen Buchanan, "Political Legitimacy and Democracy", Ethics 112/4 (2002), pp. 689-719; David Copp, "The Idea of a Legitimate State", Philosophy and Public Affairs 28/1 (1999), pp. 3-45; and Christopher Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
8. William A. Edmundson, "Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation", Law and Philosophy 17/1 (1998), pp. 43-60, Three Anarchical Fallacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law's Claim to Authority", Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 15/1 (2002), pp. 51-67. Others who have pursued this strategy include Christopher Heath Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation", Ethics 111/4 (2001), pp. 735-759; Allen Buchanan, "Political Legitimacy and Democracy", Ethics 112/4 (2002), pp. 689-719; David Copp, "The Idea of a Legitimate State", Philosophy and Public Affairs 28/1 (1999), pp. 3-45; and Christopher Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
9. William A. Edmundson, "Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation", Law and Philosophy 17/1 (1998), pp. 43-60, Three Anarchical Fallacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law's Claim to Authority", Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 15/1 (2002), pp. 51-67. Others who have pursued this strategy include Christopher Heath Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation", Ethics 111/4 (2001), pp. 735-759; Allen Buchanan, "Political Legitimacy and Democracy", Ethics 112/4 (2002), pp. 689-719; David Copp, "The Idea of a Legitimate State", Philosophy and Public Affairs 28/1 (1999), pp. 3-45; and Christopher Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
10. William A. Edmundson, "Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation", Law and Philosophy 17/1 (1998), pp. 43-60, Three Anarchical Fallacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law's Claim to Authority", Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 15/1 (2002), pp. 51-67. Others who have pursued this strategy include Christopher Heath Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation", Ethics 111/4 (2001), pp. 735-759; Allen Buchanan, "Political Legitimacy and Democracy", Ethics 112/4 (2002), pp. 689-719; David Copp, "The Idea of a Legitimate State", Philosophy and Public Affairs 28/1 (1999), pp. 3-45; and Christopher Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
11. William A. Edmundson, "Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation", Law and Philosophy 17/1 (1998), pp. 43-60, Three Anarchical Fallacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law's Claim to Authority", Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 15/1 (2002), pp. 51-67. Others who have pursued this strategy include Christopher Heath Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation", Ethics 111/4 (2001), pp. 735-759; Allen Buchanan, "Political Legitimacy and Democracy", Ethics 112/4 (2002), pp. 689-719; David Copp, "The Idea of a Legitimate State", Philosophy and Public Affairs 28/1 (1999), pp. 3-45; and Christopher Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
12. William A. Edmundson, "Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation", Law and Philosophy 17/1 (1998), pp. 43-60, Three Anarchical Fallacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law's Claim to Authority", Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 15/1 (2002), pp. 51-67. Others who have pursued this strategy include Christopher Heath Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation", Ethics 111/4 (2001), pp. 735-759; Allen Buchanan, "Political Legitimacy and Democracy", Ethics 112/4 (2002), pp. 689-719; David Copp, "The Idea of a Legitimate State", Philosophy and Public Affairs 28/1 (1999), pp. 3-45; and Christopher Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
13. William A. Edmundson, "Legitimate Authority Without Political Obligation", Law and Philosophy 17/1 (1998), pp. 43-60, Three Anarchical Fallacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law's Claim to Authority", Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 15/1 (2002), pp. 51-67. Others who have pursued this strategy include Christopher Heath Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation", Ethics 111/4 (2001), pp. 735-759; Allen Buchanan, "Political Legitimacy and Democracy", Ethics 112/4 (2002), pp. 689-719; David Copp, "The Idea of a Legitimate State", Philosophy and Public Affairs 28/1 (1999), pp. 3-45; and Christopher Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
14. The notion of a protected liberty right comes from H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 171. If an agent enjoys a protected liberty right to do X, then she is permitted to do X, and she has a claim right against others that they not prevent her from doing X. Thus the claim that the state has a protected liberty right to coercively administer the law amounts to the claim that the state enjoys an exclusive liberty right to enforce the law, a right that is violated should other states or private individuals (i.e. vigilantes) seek to do so (within the jurisdiction of the state in question). Talk of claim-rights, liberty-rights, power-rights, and immunities draws on the typology of rights first developed by Wesley Hohfeld in Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919). For a helpful exposition of Hohfeld's typology and the notion of a protected liberty-right, see Peter Jones, Rights (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
15. The notion of a protected liberty right comes from H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 171. If an agent enjoys a protected liberty right to do X, then she is permitted to do X, and she has a claim right against others that they not prevent her from doing X. Thus the claim that the state has a protected liberty right to coercively administer the law amounts to the claim that the state enjoys an exclusive liberty right to enforce the law, a right that is violated should other states or private individuals (i.e. vigilantes) seek to do so (within the jurisdiction of the state in question). Talk of claim-rights, liberty-rights, power-rights, and immunities draws on the typology of rights first developed by Wesley Hohfeld in Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919). For a helpful exposition of Hohfeld's typology and the notion of a protected liberty-right, see Peter Jones, Rights (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
16. The notion of a protected liberty right comes from H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 171. If an agent enjoys a protected liberty right to do X, then she is permitted to do X, and she has a claim right against others that they not prevent her from doing X. Thus the claim that the state has a protected liberty right to coercively administer the law amounts to the claim that the state enjoys an exclusive liberty right to enforce the law, a right that is violated should other states or private individuals (i.e. vigilantes) seek to do so (within the jurisdiction of the state in question). Talk of claim-rights, liberty-rights, power-rights, and immunities draws on the typology of rights first developed by Wesley Hohfeld in Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919). For a helpful exposition of Hohfeld's typology and the notion of a protected liberty-right, see Peter Jones, Rights (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
17. If X enjoys a power right over Y with respect to some sphere of conduct C, then X is normatively entitled to alter Y's rights and duties in C (usually within limits imposed by the rights and duties of third parties, as well as certain rights enjoyed by Y that are immune to alteration by X). So for example, if Y promises X to lend him a book, X acquires a power-right to waive Y's duty to lend him a book, thereby altering Y's duties.
18. Edmundson (1998b, p. 42).
19. Ibid., p. 61.
20. Ibid., p. 49
21. Though as a practical matter the exercise of political authority may require that commands be backed by the threat of force when those commands are not obeyed, most theorists today accept that there is no analytic connection between either the concept of authority or the concept of law and the use or threat of force.
22. Edmundson (2002, p. 53).
23. Many of the criticisms of a general, content-independent, DOAP that I develop in section II will apply equally well if subjects of a legitimate state are understood to have only a duty not to interfere in the state's exercise of its liberty right to forcefully administer the law.
24. Both of these duties may be only prima facie.
25. This assumption is shared by many defenders of political obligation as well.
26. The treatment of authoritative directives as preemptive reasons - that is, second-order reasons that exclude certain first-order reasons from an agent's consideration, and replace them with a new first-order reason - assumes a Razian conception of practical reason. Edmundson has expressed some doubts regarding Raz's defense of this conception of practical reason, though it is not clear whether he believes that, on balance, it ought to be rejected. See Raz (1986) and Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Edmundson, "Rethinking Exclusionary Reasons", Law and Philosophy 12/3 (1993), pp. 329-343.
27. The treatment of authoritative directives as preemptive reasons - that is, second-order reasons that exclude certain first-order reasons from an agent's consideration, and replace them with a new first-order reason - assumes a Razian conception of practical reason. Edmundson has expressed some doubts regarding Raz's defense of this conception of practical reason, though it is not clear whether he believes that, on balance, it ought to be rejected. See Raz (1986) and Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Edmundson, "Rethinking Exclusionary Reasons", Law and Philosophy 12/3 (1993), pp. 329-343.
28. Edmundson (1998b, p. 44).
29. I shall assume that Edmundson is an externalist with respect to reasons, so that "creating in some agent a reason to believe X" means that the agent has a reason to believe X, even if she does not recognize that this is so.
30. Edmundson (1998b, pp. 44, 47).
31. Though I think that all will accept this point with respect to Aristotle's biology or physics, it may well be more contestable with respect to Aristotle's political science or theory of moral education. The other theoretical authorities Edmundson offers as examples, however, suggest a focus on authorities in the "hard" or natural sciences.
32. Raz (1986, p. 53).
33. We may suppose that there is some practical reason for our having to form a judgment on the matter, rather than merely suspending judgment pending further inquiry.
34. Edmundson (1998b, p. 46).
35. These observations were shared in the sense that all (or all experts) were agreed on their description. Note that theory change in science often involves modification in the observations that need to be explained, as well as the introduction of a better theoretical account of what is observed.
36. Edmundson (1998b, p. 44).
37. For a suggestive discussion of this possibility, see Scott Shapiro, "Authority", in J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 382-439.
38. So for example, assume that there is a natural duty to prevent rape (at least when the cost is not too high). Disagreements over what exactly counts as rape, what methods ought to be adopted for preventing it, and how to punish rapists, present a collective action problem, insofar as these questions must be settled if agents are to act effectively to fulfill the natural duty in question. For discussion of this example see Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 105. Edmundson himself makes a similar point with respect to punishment (2002, p. 66).
39. I defend this account of political authority in David Lefkowitz, "A Moral Contractualist Defense of Political Obligation" (Ph.D. diss., University of Mary-land, 2003). Arguments akin to it can be found in Waldron (1999), Shapiro (2002), and Thomas Christiano, "Justice and Disagreement at the Foundations of Political Authority", Ethics 110/1 (1999), pp. 165-187.
40. I defend this account of political authority in David Lefkowitz, "A Moral Contractualist Defense of Political Obligation" (Ph.D. diss., University of Mary-land, 2003). Arguments akin to it can be found in Waldron (1999), Shapiro (2002), and Thomas Christiano, "Justice and Disagreement at the Foundations of Political Authority", Ethics 110/1 (1999), pp. 165-187.
41. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Edmundson (1998b, pp. 10-11).
42. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Edmundson (1998b, pp. 10-11).
43. I say "almost any violation" because citizens of a liberal democratic state enjoy an unprotected liberty right against the state to perform acts of public disobedience, which I argue do not involve an at least implicit usurpation of collective authority. For discussion of this point, see Lefkowitz (2003). For a defense of disobedience to the laws of a liberal democratic state as involving the at least implicit usurpation of collective authority, see Lefkowitz, "Reflections on the wrong involved in disobeying democratic authority," paper presented at the Association for Law, Philosophy, and Society 2003 meeting.
44. Edmundson (1998b, p. 12). Edmundson cites to a number of other philosophers and legal theorists who have also discussed this example.
45. Edmundson (1998b, p. 53).
46. By an ideal moral agent I mean one who recognizes all of the relevant reasons in a given case, and who makes no errors in assessing which reasons outweigh, or defeat, other reasons.
47. Note that in Razian terms, a content-independent DOL does not carry a certain weight that is to be placed on a balance with other reasons for action. Rather, such a duty is a preemptive reason for action, meaning that it excludes certain other reasons for action from an agent's deliberation, and that it replaces those reasons with a new reason for action: "do X because the state says do X." As I noted earlier, Edmundson expresses some concerns about Raz's conception of practical reason, and therefore I have phrased the discussion in the text in terms of the weight of a DOL.
48. Of course, my failure to obey a particular command may directly cause some harm to the police officer. But this is a reason to forbear from disobeying the officer's command distinct from the one that is at issue here, namely whether the officer's having issued a command provides me with a content-independent reason to comply. There is also the possibility that disobeying a particular command may lead to a general erosion of respect for law, so that obedience to every command can be justified on consequentialist grounds. There is no evidence that Edmundson defends this claim, however, and in any case it is doubtful that any single act of disobedience would be likely to lead to such an outcome.
49. There is some question as to whether a general DOL can be a prima facie duty. For an argument that it cannot be, see Raz (1979, p. 236).
50. To be fair, Edmundson claims only that a DOAP is "relatively" more content-independent than is a DOL (1998b, p. 52). But content-independence is an all or nothing thing - it cannot have differences of degree. Edmundson may mean that we are less likely to encounter cases in which, intuitively, we assign different weights to directives issued by the state when it comes to particular commands than in the case of general laws. But even if true, this does not support the claim that a DOAP is content-independent, while a DOL is not. If the problem is that the duty to the state must be content-independent, and yet in some cases it seems intuitively right to treat different commands issued by the state as carrying different weight, it makes no difference to this problem how frequently in practice we encounter such a situation.
51. For discussion of this example, see Raz (1986, pp. 73-74); Morris (1998, p. 208).
52. For discussion of this example, see Raz (1986, pp. 73-74); Morris (1998, p. 208).
53. Or at least he has no reason if his disobedience will not undermine respect for law in general.
54. Likewise respect for individual autonomy requires non-interference with many aspects of the way of life another person leads, even if one believes her to be leading a poor, or mistaken, lifestyle, and even if doing so prevents one from doing various activities that one would like to do (and that one believes would improve both one's own and the other's welfare).
55. Note, too, that where the assessment of a particular case calls for certain kinds of expertise in order to understand particular facts or their relevance to the case, the court has access to such expertise, through the use of expert witnesses and amicus briefs.
56. Lefkowitz (2003).
57. For additional arguments to this effect, see Larry Alexander, "Law and Exclusionary Reasons", Philosophical Topics 18/1 (1990), pp. 5-22.
58. Assume for the sake of discussion that the goods at which the cooperative schemes aim are step goods, rather than continuous ones.
59. Edmundson (2002, pp. 54-55).
60. Ibid., pp. 56-61.
61. This claim may be too strong; in certain cases, adopting a strategy such as tit-for-tat may be rational.
62. Ibid., pp. 66-67. Assurance that enough others will contribute may not suffice to generate a fair-play duty to contribute in the first "round of play." At least as Hart, Rawls, Simmons, and others construe that principle, it is receipt (or acceptance) of benefits that generates an obligation to contribute to the cooperative scheme that produces them, and no one can receive any benefits from a scheme until it is up and running. To avoid this problem, we might instead focus on certain natural duties (i.e. ones that need not be voluntarily acquired, as fair-play duties are) whose fulfillment require participation in collective action schemes. See, for example, Lefkowitz (2003); Wellman (2001).
63. Ibid., pp. 66-67. Assurance that enough others will contribute may not suffice to generate a fair-play duty to contribute in the first "round of play." At least as Hart, Rawls, Simmons, and others construe that principle, it is receipt (or acceptance) of benefits that generates an obligation to contribute to the cooperative scheme that produces them, and no one can receive any benefits from a scheme until it is up and running. To avoid this problem, we might instead focus on certain natural duties (i.e. ones that need not be voluntarily acquired, as fair-play duties are) whose fulfillment require participation in collective action schemes. See, for example, Lefkowitz (2003); Wellman (2001).
64. Ibid., pp. 66-67. Assurance that enough others will contribute may not suffice to generate a fair-play duty to contribute in the first "round of play." At least as Hart, Rawls, Simmons, and others construe that principle, it is receipt (or acceptance) of benefits that generates an obligation to contribute to the cooperative scheme that produces them, and no one can receive any benefits from a scheme until it is up and running. To avoid this problem, we might instead focus on certain natural duties (i.e. ones that need not be voluntarily acquired, as fair-play duties are) whose fulfillment require participation in collective action schemes. See, for example, Lefkowitz (2003); Wellman (2001).
65. Edmundson (2002, p. 56).
66. Ibid., p. 65.
67. See also Alexander (1990).
68. There may be a further condition that must be met, namely that there is no alternative, morally superior (or at least not morally inferior), way for the agent to fulfill his duties.
69. It would seem to follow from the truth of this claim that it is better that agents believe they have a duty to participate in a morally necessary collective action scheme even when the distribution of burdens and benefits among participants in that scheme is quite unjust. This is not obviously false, and in any case, Edmundson restricts his claims regarding legitimate authority to states that are reasonably just. For further discussion of this issue, see George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992).
70. Edmundson (2002, p. 56).
71. Heidi Hurd, for example, argues that law is theoretically authoritative insofar as it assists people in acting on the antecedently existing balance of reasons, regardless of the legislators' intentions in enacting particular laws. Heidi Hurd, Moral Combat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Ch. 6.
72. One further possibility that should be considered here is that the state must sincerely believe that things will turn out better if its subjects believe they have a DOL, even if it insincerely claims that its subjects have a DOL.
73. Whereas anarchists oppose the very existence of the state, and defend a moral imperative to eliminate it, philosophical anarchists argue against a duty to obey the law, but not necessarily that the state ought not to exist, or that individuals have a duty to seek its demise. See A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 104.
74. Edmundson (1998b, p. 34).
75. Edmundson (2002, p. 66).
76. There may be a second point of disagreement between Edmundson and at least some philosophical anarchists. In his defense of a state's claiming authority, it is not clear whether Edmundson means to say that the state has a right to make such a claim, or that while the state violates its subjects' rights (or at least their autonomy), the good that results outweighs the wrong involved in doing so. On either interpretation, a philosophical anarchist might agree with Edmundson's claim. On the first interpretation, the state might be understood to be exercising its right to free expression. Yet the right to free expression is often thought to be limited by the caveat that its exercise not result in direct harm to others (as, for example, in the case of libel, or a clear and present danger, such as yelling "fire" in a crowded theater). At least some philosophical anarchists are likely to conclude that the state violates its subjects' autonomy when it makes literally false claims regarding their duties, and that therefore the state's right to free expression does not include the liberty to make such statements. Even so, these same philosophical anarchists might accept (at least in some cases) that though the state violates its subjects' rights when it misleads them into believing that they have a DOL, the good produced by such an action justifies it. Simmons, for example, writes that "our rights may sometimes be infringed in the performance of important duties or to prevent extremely unhappy occurrences" (2001, pp. 60-61). Still, a philosophical anarchist might deny that the good produced by the state's misleading its subjects regarding their duties ever outweighs the wrong involved in violating their autonomy. It is between this last philosophical anarchist and Edmundson that there is a second point of divergence (in addition to the one discussed in the main text).