Induction and indefinite extensibility: The Gödel sentence is true, but did someone change the subject?

Mind

Volumn 107, Issue 427, 1998, Pages 597-624

  Shapiro, Stewart ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 3843091398     PISSN: 00264423     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/mind/107.427.597     Document Type: Article

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