"New fighting power!" Japan's growing maritime capabilities and east Asian security

International Security

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 84-112

  Samuels, Richard J ^a,b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b MIT Center for International Studies

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38349168638     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.84     Document Type: Article

References (133)

1. Kaijō Hoanchō, Kaijō Hōan Repōto [Japan Coast Guard annual report] (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Insatsu Kyoku, 2006) (exclamation point in the original).
2. David Fouse and Yoichiro Sato, "Enhancing Basic Governance: Japan's Comprehensive Counterterrorism Assistance to Southeast Asia," mimeo (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2006), p. 1.
3. It has been argued that a new type of transnational security community is emerging, one "based more on policing alliances against non-state actors than . . . against state-based military threats." See Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelman, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 190.
4. Portions of this section are from Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy for East Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007).
5. The term senryoku literally means "fighting power," but it was used to translate the words "war potential" by the American authors of the postwar Japanese constitution. It has ever since been the object of definitional - and therefore legal and operational - debate. For a fuller account, see ibid.;
6. and Richard J. Samuels and J. Patrick Boyd, "Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan," Policy Studies, No. 19 (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2005).
7. Akira Nakamura, Sengo Seiji ni Yureta Kenpō Kyūjō [Article nine shaken by postwar politics] (Tokyo: Chūō Keizaisha, 2001), p. 99.
8. For analysis of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, see Richard J. Samuels, "Politics, Security Policy, and Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These Guys, Anyway?" Working Paper, No. 99 (San Francisco, Calif.: Japan Policy Research Institute, March 2004).
9. Takako Hikotani, "Reisengo Nihon no Seigun Kankei" [Civil-military relations in post-Cold War Japan], in Yoshihide Soeya and Tadokoro Masayuki, eds., Nihon no Higashi Ajia Kōsō [Japan's conception of East Asia] (Tokyo: Keio Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004), chapter 11.
10. Thomas U. Berger speaks of Japan's "antimilitarist ethos," and Peter J. Katzenstein analyzes Japanese security policy based on this norm. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998);
11. and Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postivar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
12. Akihiro Sadō, Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji [Postwar Japanese defense and politics] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003), p. 82.
13. Richard J. Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1994).
14. Prime Minister Takeo Miki reaffirmed this in the Diet in 1976.
15. Hideo Otake, Nihon no Bōei to Kokunai Seiji [Japan's defense and domestic politics] (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1983), pp. 147-158.
16. For background on the experience of Prime Minister Takeo Miki at the Rambouillet summit in 1975, see Akihiko Tanaka and Koji Murata, "Takashi Maruyama Oral Interview," April 12, 1996, http://www.gwu.edu/?nsarchiv/ japan/maruyamaohinterview.htm. "National guard" is the view of former JDA Vice Minister Seiki Nishihiro.
17. See his interview in Akihiko Tanaka and Koji Murata, "Seiki Nishihiro Oral Interview," November 16, 1995, p. 5, http://www.gwu.edu/? nsarchiv/japan/nishihiroohinterview.htm.
18. JDA Director-General Michio Sakata in the foreword of the 1976 JDA White Paper "Defense of Japan," p. 8.
19. This concise definition is from Narushige Michishita, "Senryaku Shisō to shite no 'Kibanteki Bōeiryoku Kōsō'" [The basic defense capabilities doctrine as a strategic concept], in Tomoyuki Ishizu and Williamson Murray, eds., Nichibei Senryaku Shisōshi [History of U.S.-Japan strategic thinking] (Tokyo: Sairyūsha, 2005), p. 232.
20. Yoshihide Soeya describes the origin of the term. Soeya, Nihon no "Midoru Pawaa" Gaikō: Sengo Nihon no Sentaku to Kōsō [Japan's "Middle Power" diplomacy: Postwar Japan's choices and conceptions] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005), pp. 144-145.
21. Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen Hoshō: Sengo 50 Nen no Mosaku [National security: Fifty postwar years of groping] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1997), pp. 265-280;
22. and Soeya, Nihon no "Midoru Pawaa" Gaikō, pp. 153-156.
23. Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002).
24. Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989);
25. and Sado, Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji.
26. For a useful review, see Christopher W. Hughes, "Japanese Military Modernization: In Search of a 'Normal' Security Role," in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia, 2005-2006: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty (Seattle, Wash.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), pp. 105-134.
27. See National Institute for Defense Studies, ed., 2001-2002 Report on Defense and Strategic Studies: Council of Defense-Strategic Studies (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2003), pp. 17-18.
28. Jeffrey Chamberlain, "Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Military Spending: Data from Selected Published Sources" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2004), p. 5.
29. See article 25 of the Maritime Safety Agency Law.
30. The Yasukuni Shrine is the nongovernmental, but highly politicized Shinto shrine in central Tokyo where Japan's war dead are enshrined. The history of the MSA unit active in Korea had been classified for years. Kyodo News Agency, September 2, 2006.
31. Kazuhiko Inoue, "Kaijō Hoanchō Tokushu Butai 'SST' 40-mei ga Kōsakusen to Taiji suru Hi" [The day the forty members of the Japan Coast Guard's special unit "SST" confronts the spy ship], Sapio, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2002), pp. 17-19;
32. and Takao Komine, "Sude ni Kita Chōsen Kōsakusen to 'Jissen' mo Keiken!? Bēru o Nuida Kaijō Hoanchō Tokushu Butai SST no Jitsuryoku" [Already experienced "combat" with North Korean spy ship!? The unveiling of the ability of Japan Coast Guard's special unit SST], Sapio, Vol. 18, No. 5 (2006), pp. 95-97.
33. Yomiuri Shimbun, January 20, 2007.
34. U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, ed., Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, December 2002), p. 9. This was reinforced by the October 1995 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of the Treasury on the Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy.
35. U.S. Coast Guard, "Missions," http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/ . The USCG moved to the Department of Homeland Security from the Treasury Department in November 2002.
36. Vikram Mansharamani, "The Deepwater Program: A Case Study in Organizational Transformation Inspired by the Parallel Interaction of Internal and External Groups," master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004, p. 19.
37. Ibid.
38. These efforts are reviewed in ibid.
39. Bruce Stubbs, former senior staffer to Adm. James Loy, personal communication with author, May 22, 2007.
40. See also David F. Blackburn, "Use of the National Fleet Concept in Maritime Homeland Security and Defense" (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, 2003).
41. These are reviewed in Mansharamani, "The Deepwater Program"; and in Catherine Poole, "Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater System," Acquisitions Directions™ Advisory, March 2003.
42. The USCG fleet is the fortieth oldest of forty-two coast guards worldwide, and "many of its aircraft are older than the men and women who fly them." Ibid., p. 7.
43. Ibid., p. 9; and Eric Lipton, "Cost Overruns and Cracked Hulls Plague Plan to Modernize Coast Guard's Fleet," New York Times, December 9, 2006.
44. John Birkler, Brien Alkire, Robert Button, Gordon Lee, Raj Raman, John Schank, and Carl Stephens, The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater Force Modernization Plan: Can It Be Accelerated? Will It Meet Changing Security Needs? (Santa Monica, Calif.: National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation, 2004), p. iii.
45. Mansharamani, "The Deepwater Program," p. 29.
46. Birkler et al., The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater Force Modernization Plan, p. 16. On how design flaws resulting from slack oversight have hampered the Deepwater Program,
47. see Lipton, "Cost Overruns and Cracked Hulls Plague Plan to Modernize Coast Guard's Fleet."
48. Mansharamani, "The Deepwater Program," p. 12.
49. Eric Lipton, "Coast Guard to Meet Fleet Modernization," New York Times, April 18, 2007.
50. Shougo Arai, former director-general, Japan Coast Guard, interview by author, Tokyo, May 31, 2006.
51. Japan Coast Guard Law, rev., art. 2, par. 2.
52. David Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 165.
53. Arai, interview by author.
54. Seiryū Cho, "Kakushu Sentei 500-shu ha Sekai Saidai: Fushinsen Jiken to Kaijō Hoanchō no Jitsuryoku" [The 500-strong force is the world's greatest: The suspicious ship incident and the ability of the Japan Coast Guard], Gunji Kenkyū, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2002), p. 64; and former Japanese government official, interview by author, Tokyo, April 25, 2006.
55. Katsuhiko Nawano, "Kokusai Hanzai, Tero e no Yokushi Ryoku to shite: 'Shitsukoi' Kaiho, Koko ni Ari" [The force that will contain international crime and terrorism: Presenting the "persistent" Japan Coast Guard], Zaikaijin, Vol. 15, No. 9 (2002), p. 49.
56. Arai, interview by author. Arai also notes that the modernization was accelerated after the JCG's widely reported failure in March 1999 to pursue intruders off the Nōtō Peninsula.
57. Ibid.
58. Kaijō Hoanchō, Kaijō Haan Repōto, p. 9.
59. Ibid., pp. 1, 9.
60. Senior JDA official, interview by author, Tokyo, May 26, 2006.
61. Senior intelligence officer, interview by author, May 17, 2006; and Yomiuri Shimbun, February 18, 2007.
62. Akio Igarashi, "Atarashii Anzenhoshō no Kadai to Kaijō Hoanchō ni Taisuru Kitai" [The national security problem and the expectations toward the Japan Coast Guard], in Kakuda Kōtsū April 2006, pp. 36-37. Other, more hawkish, analysts insist that the "suspicious ship" incident is evidence that bulking up the JCG is insufficient and that Japan's formal military posture must be enhanced.
63. See Tsuneo Yoshihara, "Fushinsen e no Taiō wa Kokusai Hō ni Junkyo Se Yo" [Responding to the suspicious ship requires conforming to international law], Sokoku to Seinen, February 2002, pp. 24-27.
64. Senior JDA official, interview by author.
65. Yomiuri Shimbun, June 26, 2006.
66. Data are from Ministry of Finance, http://www1.mof.go.jp/data/index.htm; Bōei Nenkan Kankōkai [Defense Yearbook Publishing Group],
67. Bōei Nenkan [Defense yearbook] (various years);
68. Ministry of Finance, http://www.bb.mof.go.jp/hdocs/bxss010bh19.html; Cabinet Office, http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/2007/0125mitoshi.pdf; and. Ministry of Defense, Wagakuni No Bōei To Yosan [Japan's defense budget], 2007, draft, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/yosan/2007/yosan. pdf.
69. Ichita Yamamoto, interview by author, Tokyo, June 9, 2006.
70. John Bolton, interview by author, Washington, D.C., March 15, 2007.
71. This compares Chinese surface combatants weighing more than 500 tons and armed JCG ships. It does not mean, of course, that the JCG enjoys two-thirds of the combat power of China's navy. I am grateful to Eric Heginbotham for this comparison derived from data in James Hackett, ed., The Military Balance, 2007 (London: Routledge, for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007).
72. Sankei Shimbun, December 2, 2005.
73. Kaijō Hoanchō, Kaijō Hoan Repōto, p. 9. For direct comparisons, see GlobalSecurity.org, "Military: DD Hatsuyuki Class," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ hatsuyuki.htm. Former JCG Director-General Arai insists that the JCG's 2,000-ton ships were much more cheaply constructed than naval destroyers. He also insists that the guns are "just for decoration." Arai, interview by author. There is no indication of plans to "up armor" these ships with missiles, torpedoes, or minesweeping systems.
74. Christopher Langton, ed., The Military Balance, 2006 (London: Routledge, for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), p. 275.
75. Ibid.
76. GlobalSecurity.org, "Military: GAU-4 20mm Vulcan M61A1/MG1A2 20 mm Automatic Gun," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ aircraft/systems/m61.htm.
77. It is not clear, however, if the MSDF replenishment ships currently under way are used for both fleets.
78. Langton, The Military Balance, 2006, p. 275;
79. GlobalSecurity.org, "Military: S 100B Argus SAAB 340 AEW&C," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/saab340- specs.htm;
80. and GlobalSecurity.org, "Military: S 100B Argus SAAB 340 AEW&C," Specifications, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/europe/saab340.htm.
81. GlobalSecurity.org, "Military: Gulfstream G500," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/g550.htm.
82. Nawano, "Kokusai Hanzai Tero he no Boushi Yokushi Ryoku to shite," p. 49.
83. Ibid., p. 50.
84. Kaijō Hoanchō, Kaijō Hoan Repotō, p. 44.
85. AFX News, December 2, 2005.
86. National Institute for Defense Studies, 2001-2002 Report on Defense and Strategic Studies, pp. 17-18.
87. One minor exception was a formulaic critique from the left, arguing that expansion of the JCG is the first step toward the militarization of Japan and the ultimate return of fascism. See Atsushi Kō;ketsu,"'Fushinsen' Jiken to wa Nandatta no ka: 'Daini Kaijō Jieitai ka' suru Kaijō Hoanchō no Mokuromi" [What was the "suspicious ship" incident about? The scheme of the Japan Coast Guard that is transforming into the "second self-defense force"], Impaction, No. 129 (2002), pp. 1-3. It has been suggested that the MSDF has resented the expansion of JCG roles and missions, but there is no public evidence supporting this claim. MSDF admiral (ret.), interview by author, Tokyo, January 11, 2006.
88. Fouse and Sato, "Enhancing Basic Governance."
89. Kaijō Hoanchō, Kaijō Hoan Repotō, p. 29.
90. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 14, 2006. See also Fouse and Sato, "Enhancing Basic Governance."
91. Kaijō Hoanchō, Kaijō Hoan Repotō, p. 29; and senior JDA official, interview by author.
92. Office of Naval Intelligence and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, eds., "Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security, 2020" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard National Intelligence Coordination Center, March 1, 1999).
93. Masayuki Kikuchi reports that the original name of the working group was the North Pacific Heads of Coast Guard Agencies. Kikuchi, "Keisatsu to Kaijō Hoanchō no Tokushu Butai: Nihon no Tero Taisaku wo Kiru" [The special forces of the police and the Japan Coast Guard: Investigating Japan's terrorism policy], Gunji Kenkyū., Vol. 40, No. 12 (2005), pp. 72-83.
94. Most of this paragraph is derived from U.S. Coast Guard International Affairs, ed., "A Model for International Cooperation at Sea: The North Pacific Coast Guard Forum," unpublished briefing, 2006.
95. These tensions were made apparent in May 2006 when China and Korea canceled participation in a NPCGF tracking exercise - proposed by Tokyo - after it was mischaracterized in the press as a Proliferation Security Initiative exercise aimed at North Korea. Asahi Shimbun, May 26, 2006;
96. and Asahi Shimbun, May 31, 2006.
97. Sekai no Kansen, April 2006, pp. 160-162.
98. For the text of the joint statement, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ asia-paci/india/partner0504.html#eight/.
99. Kyodo News Agency, June 29, 2005.
100. Kaijō Hoanchō, Kaijō Hoan Repōto, p. 18. For bilateral arrangements with each neighbor, see ibid., pp. 24-27. For detail on the territorial disputes, see ibid., pp. 34-35.
101. Ibid., p. 8. See Tokyo Shimbun, May 24, 2006. For more on JCG's antipiracy activities,
102. see Asahi Shimbun, May 29, 2006.
103. Arai, interview by author.
104. Kyodo News Agency, July 3, 2006; and Yomiuri Shimbun, July 3, 2006.
105. Jiji Press, February 7, 2007.
106. Jiefangjun Bao, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), December 31, 2001.
107. Huanqiu Shibao, FBIS, December 13, 2004.
108. Dangdai Haijun, FBIS, January 1, 2005.
109. Yomiuri Shinbun, July 19, 1996.
110. Yomiuri Shinbun, September 16, 1996.
111. Yomiuri Shinbun, January 1, 2003.
112. Yomiuri Shinbun, February 9, 2005.
113. Yomiuri Shimbun, August 25, 2005.
114. Yomiuri Shimbun, July 27, 2007.
115. The formation of this auxilliary was welcomed by the JCG. See Yomiuri Shimbun, August 3, 2002.
116. For details on the ship exhibit, see Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local.
117. Ralph A. Cossa, "U.S. Security Strategy in East Asia and the Prospects for an Asian Regional Security Regime," Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (May 2005), p. 70.
118. PSI does not involve the participation of China or Russia, two members of the UN Security Council. Beijing and. Moscow have resisted on the grounds that international law does not permit the interdiction of ships on the high seas without the permission of the flagged state. Given that it would be invoked without UN authorization and that it is highly unlikely that the Japanese military would ignore a request by the United States to stop a suspected vessel bound to or from North Korea, the Japanese now risk crossing the line of both domestic and international law. See Mark Valencia, "Japan in a Corner over Interdictions at Sea," International Herald Tribune, October 22, 2005.
119. Kaijō; Hoanchō, Kaijō Hoan Repōto, p. 20.
120. MSDF participation was justified, as "research." See Fouse and Sato, "Enhancing Basic Governance," pp. 5-6.
121. GlobalSecurity.org, "Proliferation Security Initiative," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/psi.htm.
122. Team Samurai officials insisted that the exercises were not directed against any particular nation, but U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said in a speech in Tokyo in 2004 that PSI measures were targeted at nations such as North Korea. North Korean officials denounced the exercises as an "illegal attack" against them. See GlobalSecurity.org, "Exercise Team Samurai," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/team-samurai.htm.
123. Ibid.
124. Bruce B. Stubbs, "Making the '1,000 Ship Navy' a Reality," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 133, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 2-3.
125. Kyodo News Agency, August 17, 2005.
126. For a chart of international sea-lanes in East Asia, see U.S. Pacific Command, "Sea-Lanes," http://community.middlebury.edu/?scs/maps/ sealanes.gif.
127. Nawano, "Kokusai Hanzai Tero he no Boushi Yokushi Ryoku to shite," p. 49.
128. Sam Bateman, "Coast Guards: New Forces for Regional Order and Security," Asia Pacific Issues: Analysis from the East-West Center, No. 65 (March 2003), p. 3.
129. Yomiuri Shimbun, May 30, 2006.
130. Bolton, interview by author.
131. For analyses of the shifting maritime balance, see Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "China Emerges as a Maritime Power," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 2004, pp. 34-38;
132. and Eric A. McVadon, "China's Maturing Navy," Naval War College Review, Vol. 59. No. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 90-107.
133. Bateman, "Coast Guards," p. 5.