Estimating SARB's policy reaction rule

South African Journal of Economics

Volumn 75, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 659-680

  Ortiz, Alberto ^a   Sturzenegger, Federico ^b,c  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA   (Argentina)

Author keywords

Bayesian analysis; Exchange rates; Monetary policy rules; Structural estimation

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN ANALYSIS; ESTIMATION METHOD; EXCHANGE RATE; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS; INFLATION; MONETARY POLICY;

AUSTRALASIA; AUSTRALIA; CANADA; EURASIA; EUROPE; NEW ZEALAND; NORTH AMERICA; UNITED KINGDOM; WESTERN EUROPE;

EID: 38349100755     PISSN: 00382280     EISSN: 18136982     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1813-6982.2007.00146.x     Document Type: Article

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