An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy

Computational Management Science

Volumn 5, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 119-140

  Drouet, Laurent ^a   Haurie, Alain ^b   Moresino, Francesco ^a   Vial, Jean Philippe ^b   Vielle, Marc ^a,c   Viguier, Laurent ^a,d  

^a EPFL   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^d MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Climate change negotiations; Coupled constraints; Dynamic game model; Stochastic modal jumps

Indexed keywords

EID: 38349048433     PISSN: 1619697X     EISSN: 16196988     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10287-007-0043-2     Document Type: Article

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