Bounding messages for free in security protocols

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4855 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 376-387

  Arapinis, Myrto ^a   Duflot, Marie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST CRÉTEIL   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABSTRACTING; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; SECURITY SYSTEMS; VERIFICATION;

BOUNDING MESSAGES; SECURITY PROTOCOLS;

MESSAGE PASSING;

EID: 38349010575     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77050-3_31     Document Type: Conference Paper

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