Merger proposals, managerial discretion, and magnitude of shareholders' wealth gains

Journal of Economics and Business

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 1987, Pages 251-266

  Yen, Gili ^a  

^a NATIONAL CENTRAL UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38249036557     PISSN: 01486195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0148-6195(87)90021-X     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. Tender offers and management resistance
2. Interfirm tender offers and the market for corporate control
3. Merger proposals, management discretion and stockholder wealth
4. Tender offers and stockholder returns: An empirical analysis
5. The proper role of a target's management in responding to a tender offer
6. Mergers antitrust law enforcement and stockholder returns
7. Agency problems and the theory of the firm
8. The adjustment of stock prices to new information
9. Takeovers shareholder returns and the theory of the firm
10. An industry study of the profitability of mergers in the United Kingdom
11. Property rights and economic theory: A survey of recent literature
12. Rates of return to stockholders of acquired companies
13. Capitalism and the corporation
14. The economic effects of federal and state regulations of cash tender offers
15. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure
16. Valuation consequences of cash tender offers
17. An application of the three-factor performance index to measure stockholder gains from merger
18. A pedagogic note on alternative formulations of the goal of the firm
19. Risk and return: The case of merging firms
20. Mergers and the market for corporate control
21. Tender offers transaction costs and the theory of the firm
22. Financial characteristics of merged firms A multivariate analysis
23. Agency theory managerial welfare and takeover bid resistance