Direct controls and incentives systems of regulation

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 18, Issue 2 PART 2, 1990, Pages

  Kambhu, John ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38249019174     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0095-0696(90)90040-6     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Private bargaining and public relation
2. Liability law and social regulation
3. Regulation asymmetric information and auditing
4. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs
5. Crime and punishment An economic analysis
6. Directly unproductive profit seeking (DUP) activities
7. Endogenous tariffs: The political economy of trade restrictions and welfare
8. Regulation and administered contracts
9. Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes
10. The enforcement process in regulatory bureaucracies
11. Pricing decisions of regulated firms: A behavioral approach
12. Regulation in theory and practice
13. The Positive Uses of Discretion: The Good Inspector
14. Private versus social costs in bringing suit
15. Measuring the demand for litigation: Is the English rule really cheaper
16. Enforcement of occupational safety and health regulations
17. The political economy of the rent-seeking society
18. The economics of enforcing pollution taxation
19. A Note on private versus social incentives to sue in a costly legal system
20. Selecting strategies of social control over organizational life
21. Reforming public bureaucracy
22. The divergence between social and private incentives to sue A comment on Shavell Menell and Kaplow
23. Efficient awards and standards of proof in judicial proceedings
24. Optimal regulation of a multiproduct monopoly with unknown technological capabilities
25. The social versus the private incentive to bring suit in a costly legal system
26. A Model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation
27. The consequences of responsive regulation
28. The optimal enforcement of laws
29. On the efficient organization of trials
30. The economics of regulatory enforcement
31. Prices vs quantities
32. Credible commitments: Using hostages to support exchange