Forms of governance and the size of rent-seeking

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 197-210

  Corchón, Luis C ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38149030904     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0224-5     Document Type: Article

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