What types of employer actions are cognizable under Title VII?: The ramifications of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White

Rutgers Law Review

Volumn 59, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 497-531

  Lidge III, Ernest F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS   (United States)

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EID: 38149021471     PISSN: 00360465     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (249)

1. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
2. The Supreme Court has had to decide many cases interpreting Title VII's language. In regard to the anti-discrimination provision, the Supreme Court has had to delineate how intentional discrimination is proven in the absence of direct evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Or, when the employer has mixed motives. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). Hopkins was reversed in part by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166; 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The Court has also had to establish guidelines for cases when the employer has no intent to discriminate, but the employer's neutral policy has a disparate impact on one of the protected groups. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Wards Cove was reversed in part by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
3. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2414-15.
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(1) (2000).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12203.
8. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2414.
9. Id. at 2414-15.
10. Id. at 2415.
11. Id.
12. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
13. Id. at 762-63, 765.
14. Id. at 761.
15. Id. at 765.
16. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The White opinion labeled both Bill Joiner and Percy Sharkey as Sheila White's "immediate supervisor." Id. The Sixth Circuit opinion stated that the day White had a disagreement with Sharkey, White "was working under the supervision of . . . foreman Percy Sharkey." White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 793 (6th Cir. 2004), aff'd, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
27. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2410.
32. Id.
33. White, 364 F. 3d at 791.
34. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (No. 05-259). See also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 797, cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3334 (Dec. 5, 2005) (granting certiorari on that issue).
35. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2410.
36. Id. at 2410-11.
37. Id. at 2410 (quoting Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001)).
38. Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)).
39. Id. at 2410 (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)).
40. Id. at 2411 (quoting Washington, 420 F.3d at 662).
41. Id. (quoting Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2411 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000)).
44. Id. at 2411-12.
45. Id. (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 2412 (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2412 (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
58. Id. (citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984, 986 (10th Cir. 1996)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2412-13. The White Court pointed to sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act in support of its contention that the retaliation provision should not be restricted to workplace-related actions. Section 8(a)(3) bans union based discrimination in regard to terms and conditions of employment, while section 8(a)(4)'s retaliation provision simply bars an employer from discriminating "against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony." Id. at 2414 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (4) (2000)).
61. Id. at 2414.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2415.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
66. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id..
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2415-16.
77. Id. at 2416 (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2005)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2417.
82. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2418.
91. Id. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
92. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1998)).
93. Id. at 2419 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).
94. Id. at 2420.
95. See 438 F.3d 1211, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
96. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2421.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2422.
104. Id. at 2414.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2415.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2412-13.
109. Id. at 2414.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
111. 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
112. 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996).
113. 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
114. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1213.
115. Berry, 74 F.3d at 984, 986.
116. Passer, 935 F.2d at 325.
117. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2414.
122. Id. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
123. Id. at 2412.
124. Id.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
126. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2414. The Sixth Circuit may be taking this approach. In Watson v. City of Cleveland, a Title VII case, the plaintiff alleged both racial discrimination and retaliation. 202 F. App'x 844, 855 (6th Cir. 2006). In discussing the materially adverse action issue in the retaliation context, the Watson court cited White. Id. In the discrimination context, however, the Watson court did not mention White. Instead, the court referred to its pre-White materially adverse standard, a rather tough test: A materially adverse employment action must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. Id. at 854 (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996)). Thus, it appears that the Sixth Circuit is adopting a lower bar for plaintiffs in retaliation cases than in discrimination cases.
127. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2414.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (discussing "because of . . . sex" language from Title VII's anti-discrimination provision in sex harassment case).
131. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
132. Id. at 64 (citations omitted) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
133. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
134. Id. at 760-65.
135. Id. at 760-63.
136. Id. at 765. To establish this affirmative defense, the employer must prove "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Id.
137. 523 U.S. 75 (1998), cited in White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
138. 524 U.S. 775 (1998), cited in White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
139. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80).
140. Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788).
141. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786 (introducing discussion of sexual harassment law by citing Title VII's substantive anti-discrimination provision); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78 (same).
142. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415; see also Hussain v. Principi, 344 F. Supp. 2d 86, 103 (D.D.C 2004) (stating that "[t]he legal standard for 'adverse actions' is the same for a retaliation claim as for a discrimination claim"). In addition, the same standards should be applied to the other federal employment discrimination statutes. See, e.g., Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing ADEA and Title VII cases for a materially adverse issue in ADA cases "because cases involving the ADEA and Title VII are instructive in cases involving the ADA"); Kidane v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 12, 17 (D.D.C. 1999) (stating that "the same standards apply in evaluating claims of . . . retaliation under Title VII and § 1981").
143. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
144. Id.
145. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
146. Id. at 80.
147. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
148. Id. (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
149. Id. (citing 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 669 (3d ed. 1996)).
150. Id. (citing U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUALS § 8, at 8-13 (1998).
151. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
152. Id.
153. The lack of clarity in White's material adversity test can be illustrated by a post-White Sixth Circuit case, Freeman v. Potter, 200 F. App'x 439 (6th Cir. 2006). In Freeman, the plaintiff alleged that the employer denied him a transfer from his position as supervisor of customer service to a postmaster position at another post office because of his age. Because there was no evidence that the specific postmaster position, which paid less, was more prestigious than the supervisor position, or afforded the plaintiff significant career opportunities, the court found that the plaintiff did not suffer a materially adverse employment action. Id. at 443-48. The dissent, however, citing White, believed that the plaintiff had suffered a materially adverse employment action. Id. at 446-54 (Clay. J., dissenting). In the Sixth Circuit, the citation of unpublished opinions is disfavored, although parties may cite them for their precedential value in some circumstances. 6TH CIR. R. 28(g).
154. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
155. Id. at 2415-16.
156. 85 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1996).
157. Id. at 274-75.
158. 31 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 1994).
159. Id. at 457-58.
160. 993 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1993).
161. Id. at 133, 135-36.
162. 865 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1989).
163. Id. at 884-85.
164. Id. at 886.
165. 126 F. App'x 745 (7th Cir. 2005). In the Seventh Circuit, unpublished orders cannot be cited as precedent, see 7TH CIR. R. 53(e), but may be considered persuasive. See Estate of Warner v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 551, 556 (N.D. Ill. 1990)).
166. Moore, 126 F. App'x at 747-48.
167. 381 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2004).
168. Id. at 625-26.
169. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
170. Crady, 993 F.2d at 133.
171. Id. at 136.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
174. 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1996).
175. Id. at 486.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 488-89.
178. 117 F. App'x 769 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion). The District of Columbia Circuit rules allow citation of unpublished opinions. See D.C. CIR. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B) (unpublished dispositions "entered on or after January 1, 2002, may be cited as precedent"); D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2) (while unpublished dispositions may be cited as precedent "a panel's decision to issue an unpublished disposition means the panel sees no precedential value in disposition").
179. Johnson, 117 F. App'x at 770.
180. Revised Brief of Appellant at 6, Johnson, 117 F. App'x 769 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-5221).
181. Johnson, 117 F. App'x at 771.
182. Id. at 771-72. Cases from other circuits also present a problem. For example, in Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1996), an ADA case, the challenged employment action was a reassignment of the employee from a nursing supervisory position to a unit RN job, with a different number of patients and nurses under her responsibility and greater physical demands. According to the court, this was not a materially adverse employment action because the employee had not lost prestige or compensation and there was no material modification of her duties. Id. at 886-87.
183. See, e.g., Ernest F. Lidge III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in Requiring Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove that the Employer's Action Was Materially Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333, 336 n.22 (1999) (listing cases).
184. The Sixth Circuit has recognized White's relaxation of the demand on plaintiffs in Title VII retaliation cases. See Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that the White Court test was "even less demanding of a plaintiff employee than that stated in our en banc majority opinion"). See also McCullough v. Kirkum, 212 F. App'x 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that White established a "more relaxed standard" for Title VII retaliation claims).
185. See infra notes 212-231 and accompanying text.
186. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2415-16.
190. Id.
191. 420 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2005).
192. Id. at 659.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 662.
195. Id. Catbert was the evil human resources director in the Dilbert comic strip who delighted in "pouncing on employees' idiosyncratic vulnerabilities." Id. The court suggested that the employer "may have a Catbert in its management." Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 663 (citation omitted).
200. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. A court should take into account financial costs suffered by Washington in deciding the amount of compensatory (and perhaps punitive) damages. But the lesser financial cost to David should not bar his retaliation claim.
204. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 2415-16.
206. Id. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
207. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
208. Id. at 431.
209. 420 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2005). For a discussion of Washington, see supra text accompanying notes 191-203.
210. Knowledge of the plaintiff's vulnerabilities is different from another issue - knowledge of the employee's protected conduct. Knowledge of the latter is a necessary element of a retaliation claim. See Muhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that "to establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must show . . . plaintiff's exercise of his civil rights was known by the defendant"); Buttner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707, 715 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[a] plaintiff must show the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the protected activity in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation").
211. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1999).
212. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Courts often apply the BMW factors to employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 943 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that BMW factors, including "the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct," were "instructive" in reviewing Title VII punitive damages award). See also Stacy A. Hickox, Reduction of Punitive Damages for Employment Discrimination: Are Courts Ignoring our Juries?, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1081, 1089 (2003) (stating that "[c]ourts have consistently applied the BMW model to reduce the punitive damage awards in various discrimination claims").
213. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
214. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
215. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000). This discussion of the NLRA is based in part on a section in a previous article I wrote. See Lidge, supra note 183, at 403-04.
216. White. 126 S. Ct. at 2414 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 76 n.8 (1984)).
217. Microimage Display Div. of Xidex Corp., 297 N.L.R.B. 110, 111 (1989), enforced, 924 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Xidex, the Board rejected the administrative law judge's finding that the transfer was de minimis and, instead, found that, combined with other violations, the action was a "substantial violation." Id.
218. Landen, 251 N.L.R.B. 476, 476-77 (1980).
219. Sands Motel. 280 N.L.R.B. 132, 141 (1986).
220. F & R Meat Co., 296 N.L.R.B. 759, 767 (1989).
221. See House Calls, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 311, 312-13 (1991); Advertiser's Mfg. Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 1185, 1190-91 (1986), enforced, 823 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1987).
222. Goodman Inv., Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 340, 349-50 (1989).
223. Mid-South Bottling Co., 287 N.L.R.B. 1333, 1342-43 (1988), enforced, 876 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1989).
224. 326 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1998).
225. Id. at 1361.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1358.
228. Id. See also Airborne Freight Corp., No. 8-CA-28047, 1999 WL 33454716 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 23, 1999) (administrative law judge finding that employer violated section 8(a)(3) of NLRA by giving an employee a verbal warning).
229. For a case in which the Board found the action too minor for coverage under the NLRA, see Woodcliff Lake Hilton Inn, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1069 (1986), enforced, 813 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1987) (administrative law judge found that "change in the method of making overtime assignments was at most de minimis" and was not "discriminatorily motivated").
230. See supra text accompanying note 213.
231. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see Lidge, supra note 183, at 404-07.
232. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
233. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2419 (2006) (Alito. J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Ellerth. 524 U.S. at 761-62).
234. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
235. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2421-22 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
236. Id. at 2413.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2416-17 (citing EEOC Dec. No. 74-77, 1974 WL 3847. *4 (Jan. 18. 1974)).
240. Id. at 2415-16.
241. Cf. Kohler v. Inter-Tel Technologies, 244 F.3d 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that when supervisor gave plaintiff a poor evaluation and inconvenient work schedules and withheld training and assistance for rejecting supervisor's advances, it was "questionable" whether these acts constituted a tangible employment action); Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 284-86 (5th Cir. 2000) (allegations that supervisor propositioned plaintiff fifteen times, attempted to initiate discussions about their sexual proclivities, called plaintiff "honey" in front of other employees, and repeatedly demanded that plaintiff get her coffee, cold drinks, and snacks were actionable but not tangible employment actions); Barra v. Rose Tree Media School Dist., 858 A.2d 206, 217-18 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (finding, in Title VII and state antidiscrimination law case, that plaintiff's allegations: [T]hat she was given a heavier workload than others; she was required to maintain a daily log of her work and work locations; she was not invited to meetings with vendors; her office keys were taken when the locks were changed on the Education Center; she was not given a performance evaluation; and she received numerous critical, insulting e-mails from her supervisor . . . . . . . did not meet the Ellerth tangible employment action standard; however, such allegations may be actionable under the anti-discrimination laws).
242. 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
243. Id. at 141.
244. Id. at 143.
245. Id. at 148.
246. Id.
247. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (10th Cir. 1996).
248. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
249. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).