Intruders with caps

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4533 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 20-35

  Anantharaman, Siva ^a   Narendran, Paliath ^b   Rusinowitch, Michael ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ D'ORLÉANS   (France)

^b STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^c LORIA   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTRUSION DETECTION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBLEM SOLVING; SET THEORY;

DECRYPTION FUNCTIONS; REWRITE SYSTEM MODELING;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 38049162024     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73449-9_4     Document Type: Conference Paper

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