Terrorists, insurgents, and criminals - Growing nexus?

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 80-93

  Oehme III, Chester G ^a  

^a Defense Intelligence Agency   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 38049049204     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10576100701767130     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. For recent debates on theBush doctrine, see the following selections:RObert Jervis, "Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained," Political Science Quarterly 118 (Fall 2003), pp. 351-377
2. John L. Hammond, "The Bush Doctrine, Preventive War, and International Law," Philosophical Forum 36(1) (Spring 2005), pp. 97-111
3. G. John Ikenberry, America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs 81(5) (September/October 2002), pp. 44-60
4. Melvin P. Leffler, "Bush's Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy 144 (September/October 2004), pp. 22-28
5. Ivo Daadler and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions, 2002)
6. and Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
7. Philip H. Gordon, "The End of the Bush Revolution," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2006), pp. 75-86.
8. The core of the insurgency is dominated by Sunni elements and their allies, but Shi'a groups probably constitute the largest organized criminal threat in Iraq. In particular, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), the armed component of the political movement led by powerful cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, is not only blamed for instigating much of the sectarian violence, but also for stimulating the growth of organized criminal networks over the past few years. In fact, many of the criminals associated with the JAM may simply be opportunists who have taken advantage of the schisms in the Sadr movement.
9. These gaps can be loosely defined as ungovernable rural areas, pockets of chaos in urban centers, and municipalities where the legitimacy of government institutions is questionable. For a broad discussion on the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction, see Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2005), pp. 134-146.
10. Louise Shelley, "The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism," Brown Journal of World Affairs XI(2)(Winter/Spring 2005), p. 103.
11. Louise Shelley, "The Nexus of Organized International Criminals and Terrorism," International Annals of Criminology 20 (2002), pp. 85-92
12. and Louise Shelly, John T. Picarelli, Allison Irby, Douglas M. Hart, Patricia A. Craig-Hart, PhilWilliams, Steven Simon, Nabi Abdullaev, Bartosz Stanislawski, and Laura Covill, Methods and Motives: Exploring the Links between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 23 June 2005).
13. This zone can be conceptually differentiated from a nation-state that is progressing through a transition period, where the government has crossed a "tipping point" and is likely to become more stable and functional over time. Conversely, if a country is trapped in an interstitial zone, essentially on the brink of chaos or stability, it remains much more susceptible to exploitation by non-state actors. One recent study argues that the underlying core assumptions scholars have used to define the authoritarianism-to-democracy "transition paradigm" do not reflect actual experience today. Democratization does not unfold in a set sequence of stages, and underlying conditions in "transitional" countries - for example, economic level, levels of violence, ethnic disharmony, and institutional legacies - are major factors that impact the process. Most transitional countries enter a political gray zone for a long period of time, where they are neither authoritarian nor clearly headed toward democracy. See Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm." Journal of Democracy 13(1) (2002), pp. 5-21.
14. Tamara Makarenko, Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: The Emerging Nexus, White Paper, Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews, 2002, pp. 1-10.
15. The level of inter-group cooperation and interaction is dependent on a variety of interdependent variables, not least ofwhich includes the assessment of risk, opportunities, advantages, and capabilities. Specific factors that probably encourage greater association, at least from an operational perspective, include: Access to greater financial resources, expertise, and intelligence; enhanced protection and logistical capabilities; and the sharing of tactics, techniques, and methods.
16. Shelley et al., Methods and Motives.
17. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 11 January 2007), pp. 12-13
18. Christopher M. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 10 December 2006)
19. and Amalendu Misra, Afghanistan (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2004).
20. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 (Executive Summary). Available at (http://www.unodc.org/pdf/ execsummaryafg.pdf)
21. see also Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, pp. 2-4.
22. U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2006, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005). Note: The GDP estimate came from the UN Office of Drug and Crime.
23. Ibid., p. 15.
24. Raphael F. Perl, Taliban and the Drug Trade, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 5 October 2001)
25. and Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy. For two U.S. federal criminal cases that shed light on the conspiracy among Taliban operatives, drug traffickers, and Islamic extremists,
26. see U.S. v. Bashir Noorzai, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S1 05 Cr. 19, 25 April 2005
27. and U.S. v. Baz Mohammed, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S14 03 Cr. 486 [DC], 25 October 2005.
28. Misra, Afghanistan, p. 128.
29. Larry Goodson, "Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan." Journal of Democracy 16(1) (January 2005), p. 24.
30. Pakistani nationals play a prominent role in all aspects of the drug trade in the Southern region, where distribution networks frequently are organized along regional and ethnic lines. Other organized criminal groups from Central Asia are reportedly involved in smuggling drugs to Turkey, Russia, and Central Europe. See U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2005, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006).
31. Thomas M. Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines." SAIS Review 24(1) (2004), pp. 49-61.
32. Chris Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24(1) (January 2001), p. 55.
33. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead, January 2007, National Intelligence Estimate (Key Judgments), available at (http://www.dni.gov/).
34. James A. Baker, Lee Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson, The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2006), p. 9.
35. Robert E. Looney, "The Business of Insurgency." National Interest No. 81 (Fall 2005), pp. 67-72.
36. David Kaplan, "Paying for Terror." US News and World Report, 5 December 2005, pp. 40-53.
37. Ibid., p. 67.
38. Looney, "The Business of Insurgency," pp. 67-72.
39. Ibid., p. 69.
40. Jessica Stern, "The Protean Enemy." Foreign Affairs 82(4) (July/August 2003), pp. 27-40;
41. see also Looney, "The Business of Insurgency,"L pp. 67-72.
42. Loretta Napoleoni, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the TerrorNetworks (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2003)
43. and Douglas Fare, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (New York: Broadway Books, 2004).
44. Looney, "The Business of Insurgency," pp. 67-72.
45. According to Interpol, "In placement, money derived from criminal activities is introduced into the financial system.... In layering, the money launderer manipulates the illicit funds to make them appear as though they were derived from a legitimate source. A component of many layering schemes has been seen to be the transfer of money from one account to another.... In the final stage of money laundering, integration, the launderer invests in other assets, uses the funds to enjoy his ill-gotten gains or to continue to invest in additional illegal activities." Interpol General Secretariat, The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering, January 2000. Available at (http://www.interpol/int/Public/ FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp).
46. Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report, p. 22.
47. Looney, "The Business of Insurgency," pp. 67-72.
48. Mark S. Hamm, Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research, and Prevention, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice (Washington, DC), 1 June 2005
49. Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation." See also Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1999)
50. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004)
51. and Rohan Gunaratna, Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
52. David Gootnick, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to be Better Defined General Accountability Office, 30 June 2005, p. 25.
53. Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance, General Accountability Office, 5 July 2005.
54. William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." Parameters (Autumn 2003), pp. 95-112
55. see also Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report.
56. The U.S. Department of Defense identifies the four planning phases as the Shape Phase (I), Deter Phase (II), Stabilize Phase (III), and Enable Civil Authority Phase (IV). Joint Publication 5.0 states that the last two phases "generally require a high level of coherent, coordinated interagency activity. The complex nature of the security, transition, and reconstruction operations - and other stability operations conducted during these phases - also normally includes joint force interaction with many IGOs [intergovernmental organizations], NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], regional security organizations, and host-nation organizations. Continual liaison and sharing of information between the joint forces and these agencies via the JIACG [joint interagency coordination group], civil-military operations center, and other venues will be instrumental in accomplishingUSnational objectives." Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5.0, 26 December 2006, pp. II-7-II-8.
57. David C. Henderson and Robert W. Tucker, Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 2005), p. 7.
58. For detailed discussion on the systemic problems in Iraq's criminal justice system, see Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report, pp. 52-55.
59. Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq's Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience (National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 11.
60. Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," pp. 95-112.
61. Tucker B. Mansager, "Interagency Lessons Learned inAfghanistan," Joint ForcesQuarterly, No. 40 (2006), pp. 81-82.
62. Raymond A. Millen, Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005.
63. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy.
64. This USAID-managed program is one element of a five-part program targeted to eliminate poppy cultivation and increase licit crop activity and total agriculture contribution to the country's gross national product. The program, which affects poppy cultivation, income levels, and economic development, comes with a cost to farmers. Because of the loss of income, farmers are provided with short-term income opportunities through cash-for-work programs (Source: USAID, Afghanistan Operational Plan for FY 2006, 12 June 2006).
65. Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Hasty Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan Can Sow More Problems," Christian Science Monitor 80(81) (23March 2006), p. 9
66. Carl Robichaud, "Remember Afghanistan: A Glass Half Full, On the Titanic." World Policy Journal 23(1) (Spring 2006), pp. 17-24.
67. Rathmell et al., Developing Iraq's Security Sector, pp. 86-91.
68. United Nations, Rule-of-Law for Post-Conflict States: Mapping the Justice Sector, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (New York and Geneva: United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006), pp. 31-32.
69. Ibid., pp. xvi-xvii.
70. Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report, pp. 10-11.
71. Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime," pp. 49-61.