Adverse contract incentives and investment banker reputation: Target firm tender offer fees

Journal of Financial Research

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 135-156

  McLaughlin, Robyn M ^a  

^a SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38049006631     PISSN: 02702592     EISSN: 14756803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.1996.tb00589.x     Document Type: Article

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