The economics of cartels, cartel policy, and collusion: Introduction to the special issue

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 6, 2006, Pages 1079-1082

  Hinloopen, Jeroen ^a   Martin, Stephen ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust policy; Collusion; Competition policy; Tacit collusion

Indexed keywords

EID: 37849188725     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.006     Document Type: Editorial

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