The origins of article III "arising under" jurisdiction

Duke Law Journal

Volumn 57, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 263-344

  Bellia Jr , Anthony J ^a  

^a Notre Dame Law School ^*

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EID: 37849037687     PISSN: 00127086     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (17)

1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
2. In 1875, Congress gave federal circuit courts jurisdiction of "all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity... arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority," subject to an amount-incontroversy requirement of five hundred dollars. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Following reenactments and reformulations of the 1875 act, federal district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
3. Specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that "a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution." Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
4. In Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), the Court held that a federal district court could exercise federal question jurisdiction if it "appears from the [complaint] that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application o-f [federal law]."
5. Id. at 199.
6. In Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), the Court held that a district court could not exercise federal question jurisdiction even though the plaintiff's claim rested upon a provision of federal law that a state law had incorporated on the ground that Congress had not provided a private federal right of action for a violation of the federal provision.
7. Id. at 802-12.
8. In Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005), the Court attempted to reconcile this line of decisions interpreting the federal question jurisdiction statute by holding that a federal court may exercise federal question jurisdiction over a civil action that "necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities."
9. Id. at 2368.
10. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807 ("Although the constitutional meaning of 'arising under' may extend to all cases in which a federal question is 'an ingredient' of the action, we have long construed the statutory grant of federal-question jurisdiction as conferring a more limited power." (citation omitted));
11. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494 (1983) ("Although the language of § 1331 parallels that of the 'Arising Under' Clause of Art. III, this Court never has held that statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Article III 'arising under' jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true.");
12. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959) ("Of course the many limitations which have been placed on jurisdiction under §1331 are not limitations on the constitutional power of Congress to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts.");
13. see also Grable, 125 S. Ct. at 2371 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring) ("This Court has long construed the scope of the statutory grant of federal-question jurisdiction more narrowly than the scope of the constitutional grant of such jurisdiction. I assume for present purposes that this distinction is proper ...."
14. (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807-08)).
15. Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
16. Id. at 823.
17. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added). Several scholars have characterized Osborn as standing for this proposition.