Ambiguity aversion, games against nature, and dynamic consistency

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 106-115

  Ozdenoren, Emre ^a   Peck, James ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Ambiguity aversion; Dynamic consistency; Ellsberg; Malevolent nature; Uncertainty aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 37849018207     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.010     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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8. Siniscalchi, M., 2004. Dynamic choice under ambiguity. Working paper