The use and limits of Martin-Quinn scores to assess supreme court justices, with special attention to the problem of ideological drift

Northwestern University Law Review

Volumn 101, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1891-1903

  Farnsworth, Ward ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 37749052519     PISSN: 00293571     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (36)

1. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007).
2. Id. at 1526-28.
3. Id. at l503 n.87.
4. Id.
5. The references to which Epstein et al. refer the readers are Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002)
6. and Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005).
7. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 4, at 137;
8. Martin et al., supra note 4, at 1297 & n.75.
9. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1502-06.
10. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 4, at 150.
11. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1505-06 fig.5 (Ginsburg);
12. id. at 1511-12 fig.7 (Scalia);
13. id. at 1518 fig. 12 (Breyer and Thomas);
14. see also Martin & Quinn, supra note 4, at 146 tbl. 1.
15. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1503.
16. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989);
17. GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED: PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974).
18. See Martin et al, supra note 4, at 1307.
19. See discussion infra at Sec. II.
20. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 4, at 145 (noting the "prima facie sensible" plausibility of the sorting produced by their model: Marshall, Brennan, and Warren to one side; and Burger, Rehnquist, and Scalia to the other);
21. id. at 146 (comparing results with other measures of conservative and liberal voting).
22. See Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court's Criminal Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67 (2005);
23. see also Ward Farnsworth, The Role of Law in Close Cases: Some Evidence from the Federal Courts of Appeals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1083 (2007).
24. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Who Change: A Response to Epstein et al, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1885, 1886 (2007),
25. NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 132, 133 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/9/.
26. See Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 157, 157-58 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003).
27. For an overview of Rehnquist's appointment and performance, see Keith E. Whittington, William H. Rehnquist: Nixon's Strict Constructionist, Reagan's Chief Justice, In REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC, supra note 16, at 8.
28. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1525 ("[T]o be sure, some Presidents would not have objected to the drift exhibited by their Justices. Justice Scalia is a prime example.").
29. Id. at 1515-17.
30. Id. at 1540.
31. See Martin et al., supra note 4, at 1304-1307.
32. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1493.
33. Id. at 1486.
34. Id. at 1526-27 (footnote omitted).
35. Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some Republican Supreme Court Justices 'Evolve ' and Others Don't?, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 457 (2007).
36. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1486.