Is partial tax harmonization desirable?

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 254-267

  Conconi, Paola ^a,b,c   Perroni, Carlo ^b,d   Riezman, Raymond ^d,e  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d CESIFO   (Germany)

^e UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

Commitment; Partial coordination; Tax competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 37549056166     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.03.010     Document Type: Article

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