Money, politics, and the regulation of public accounting services: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Accounting, Organizations and Society

Volumn 33, Issue 2-3, 2008, Pages 229-248

  Thornburg, Steven ^a   Roberts, Robin W ^b  

^a WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 37349010359     PISSN: 03613682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2007.03.004     Document Type: Article

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