Intermediaries as quality assessors: Tour operators in the travel industry

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 372-392

  Clerides, Sofronis ^a,b   Nearchou, Paris ^a   Pashardes, Panos ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS   (Cyprus)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Information provision; Intermediaries; Middlemen; Tourism and travel industry

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION THEORY; KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS; MARKETING; PUBLIC POLICY;

INFORMATION PROVISION; INTERMEDIARIES; MIDDLEMEN; TOURISM AND TRAVEL INDUSTRY;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 37249079312     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.02.001     Document Type: Article

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