Partially ordered cooperative games: Extended core and Shapley value

Annals of Operations Research

Volumn 158, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 143-159

  Puerto, J ^a   Fernandez F R ^a   Hinojosa, Y ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SEVILLE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Cooperative games; Core; Partial order; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 37249065739     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-007-0242-9     Document Type: Conference Paper

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