Multi-robot negotiation: Approximating the set of subgame perfect equilibria in general-sum stochastic games

Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1001-1008

  Murray, Chris ^a   Gordon, Geoffrey J ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME-THEORETIC; MULTI-AGENT PLANNING; MULTIROBOTS; NEGOTIATION PROTOCOL; PLANNING ALGORITHMS; PLANNING PROBLEM; REAL-WORLD PLANNING PROBLEM; STOCHASTIC GAME; TWO-LINE;

ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY;

ROBOT PROGRAMMING;

EID: 37249051446     PISSN: 10495258     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (13)

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13. Chris Murray and Geoffrey J. Gordon. Multi-robot negotiation: approximating the set of subgame perfect equilibria in general-sum stochastic games. Technical Report CMU-ML-06-114, Carnegie Mellon University, 2006.