Intimidating competitors - Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 247-265

  Buehler, Stefan ^a,b,c   Schmutzler, Armin ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b VIENNA UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Austria)

^c ENCORE ^*  (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Cost reduction; Investment; Vertical integration; Vertically related oligopolies

Indexed keywords

LINEAR COURNOT MODEL; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; VERTICALLY RELATED OLIGOPOLIES;

BENCHMARKING; COST REDUCTION; INVESTMENTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

EID: 37249040674     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.005     Document Type: Article

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